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I. INTRODUCTION
One hears the word “federalism” with some frequency these days. The
debates over medical marijuana, capital punishment, abortion, assisted suicide,
capital punishment, school financing, and even environmental policy, all have
vital federalism dimensions. And as political conservatives have come
increasingly to dominate the federal government, conservatives and liberals alike
have reconsidered their commitments to federalism. On these and other issues,
the word “federalism” has transformed from a tired shibboleth for political
conservatism into a more interesting, if complex, focus for conversation and
debate.
The debate continues, but lawyers, academics, and concerned citizens who
seek guidance on federalism issues in the pages of the United States Reportswill
not find a consistent theory of federalism within. The United States Supreme
Court’s fractured federalism opinions provide invariably Byzantine, frequently
contradictory, and generally unhelpful advice. It is tempting to adapt Lord
Macaulay’s dim view of the United States Constitution to the Supreme Court’s
federalism opinions: “all sail and no anchor.”3
We share the frustrations of those who search for a new paradigm. In light
of the enormous size and scope of the federalism question, we feel that the best
way to move the conversation forward—the best way really to explore the secret
workings of American federalism—is to break out of foreordained conceptual
categories. What is called for is a free-wheeling, broad ranging, and altogether
unreserved dialectic. Accordingly, we offer the reader the following exchange as
a contribution to the ongoing scholarly dialogue on federalism.4
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II. PHANTOM FEDERALISM?:

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

Steve,
Many commentators consider the Supreme Court’s recent cases construing
the Commerce Clause, especially United States v. Lopez and United States v.
Morrison,5 to be the central axis of developing federalism jurisprudence.6 I
generally think this attitude is wrong. Not only are the origins of federalism
deeply historic, running back to the very earliest decisions of the Supreme Court,
but if there are any strong doctrines of federalism in the United States Reports
they descend from the intergovernmental immunities7 and comity/abstention8
decisions of the 1970s.
I think that a more useful approach is to ask to what extent the Supreme
Court’s decisions reflect, or should reflect, various possible views regarding the
relationship of the federal and state governments. The two views I want to
examine are (1) the independent state modeland (2) the enumerated -power
model. Model (1), the independent state model, focuses on areas of regulation—
that is, subjects of state and federal policy. It would protect the independence of
the State governments by using judicial review to defeat assertions of federal
power in certain policy areas, which would then be left entirely to the states. It
works exactly like individual rights: every federal power is one stick in a bundle
of sticks, and the independent state model uses the Supreme Court asa knife to
cut through them. Model (2), the enumeration model, focuses on powers rather
than policies. It would treat federalism interests as already reflected in the
enumeration of federal powers in the Constitution. According to this model, the
assertion of federalism interests in a Commerce Clause case (indeed in any case)
is profoundly question-begging. Surely if “we, the people” delegated a power to
the federal government through the act of ratification,9 then it’s irrelevant whether
the Supreme Court, or anyone else, thinks the delegation was hasty or unwise.
5
U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”); Gonzales v. Raich,
125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
6
See, e.g., Jesse Choper and John Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause After Morrison, 25
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 843 (Fall 2000); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the uses and Limits of
Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998); Bradford R. Clark, Translating
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Model (1) is pretty radical. While the Supreme Court briefly flirted with it
National League of Cities v. Usery,10 model (2) generally predominates, as it
should. When asked whether Congress can do something, lawyers ought to look
to the Constitution, oughtn’t they?
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
Obviously so, but nevertheless Lopez and Morrison stirred quite the
controversy about federalism.11 It’s not clear to me, however, that the narrow
holdings of Lopez and Morrison justified the tumult. In Lopez, the Supreme
Court struck down a Gun Free School Zones Act provision that criminalized
knowing possession of a firearm near a school building. Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court argued that carrying a handgun in or near a
school is neither commercial nor economic, “however broadly one might define
those terms.”12 A debatable proposition, to be sure, but I’m inclined to agree.
Whatever the words “Commerce … among the several States” may mean, they do
not directly refer to intrastate weapons possession. Chief Justice Rehnquist
allowed that the government might have prevailed if the statute were a necessary,
“essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity,” but the provision at
issue in Lopez plainly was not.13 The basic claim isn’t too radical. Regardless of
whether Lopez is right, the Court speaks in the language of your model (2) above:
“we, the people” did not delegate to Congress the power to punish simple
weapons possession, unless the government proves that a specific act of
possession, in a specific case, is connected to interstate commerce—as when a
statute enumerates interstate travel or use of a weapon that has traveled in
interstate commerce as an element of a criminal offense.14
A few years later, in Morrison, the Supreme Court struck down a
provision of the Violence Against Women Act. The provision created a federal
civil damages action for victims of violent conduct that is motivated by the
victim’s gender. The holding necessarily sweeps somewhat more broadly than
Lopez because Congress explicitly found that when considered in the aggregate,
violence against women that is motivated by the victim’s gender seriously affects
interstate commerce,15 findings that the Court criticized and rejected.16
10
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Admittedly, the Chief Justice strays into your independent state model.
He cited Lopez and discussed worries that Congress could decide for itself that
aggregate effects were present and regulate “family law and other areas of
traditional State regulation” based on “the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce,
and childrearing on the national economy.”17 But the Chief Justice’s opinion
pulls itself back from the brink of model (1) by establishing a fairly clear rule: he
explicitly “reject[ed] the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic,
violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on
interstate commerce.”18 Why? The majority saw the core question as one of
delegation. The people delegated limited powers to Congress. The ratifying
population almost certainly did not mean to delegate “police power” to a distant
federal legislature or to vitiate the “distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local.”19 Independent states reasoning, I suppose. But the rule itself
isn’t specifically tied to the States as States, and so it fits more nearly with your
enumerated powers model. The federalism rhetoric isn’t necessary for or relevant
to the result.
So if this is a federalism revolution, it is a tame one indeed—though I
worry that we’ve reached that conclusion by defining federalism so that almost no
one is in favor of it. Loose talk of “police power” is disturbing, but very few
federal statutes rest solely on aggregate economic effects analysis. Let me
suggest something slightly different. Commerce Clause law before Lopez was
hardly unambiguous. I think Eric Claeys’s explanation of the New Deal cases is a
good one. He argues that post-New Deal rational basis review was really a
compromise between progressive reformers (who believed in unlimited
congressional power) and the Supreme Court (which the public must perceive to
be principled).20 Professor Claeys describes the New Deal-era Supreme Court’s
“key innovation” as the modification of the substantial effects test in the NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel21 case: that case, he argues, “reversed the basic
orientation of pre-1937 doctrine by reversing the direction of the ‘effects’ test.
Roughly speaking, from Gibbons to the New Deal, the ‘effects’ test tried to
maintain a principled line between interstate commerce and local activities” by
permitting Congress to invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause and the
Supremacy Clause to regulate intrastate activity “only after it was [already] clear
17

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-616 (2000) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575-79 (Kennedy, J,
concurring)).
18
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
19
Id., 529 U.S. at 617-18 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937)).
20
Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive Political Theory and
the Commerce Clause after Lopez Morrison, 11 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 403, 429-42
(December 2002).
21
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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the law’s primary effect was to regulate interstate commerce.”22 The new
substantial effects test, by contrast, permitted Congress to regulate nearly any
activity, but “[b]ecause the test continued to distinguish between interstate
commerce and local activities” in principle, “it preserved the idea that the
Commerce Clause was one of several limited and enumerated powers.”23 I’m less
cynical than Professor Claeys, but plainly Lopez and Morrison disambiguate the
New Deal settlement that he aptly describes.
The Supreme Court’s holdings in Lopez and Morrison may destabilize
consensus in the legal community, but they do not, without more, inject radical
extratextual federalism principles into constitutional law. I’m not conceding that
the decisions are correct (far from it), but it’s clear to me that Lopez and Morrison
don’t disturb the core Commerce Clause precedents. The respondents in
Gonzales v. Raich24 relied on Lopez and Morrison to ask the Supreme Court to
hold that the Controlled Substance Act’s global criminal prohibition against
marijuana was invalid as applied to intrastate, medical use of marijuana by
terminally ill cancer patients. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens
quipped that “[i]n their myopic focus, [respondents] overlook the larger context of
modern-era Commerce Clause jurisprudence preserved by those cases.”25 Lopez
and Morrison involved challenges alleging “that a particular statute or provision
fell outside Congress’[s] commerce power in its entirety” rather than a challenge
“ask[ing the Supreme Court] to excise individual applications of a concededly
valid statutory scheme.”26
As I’ve re-rold it, surely Professor Claeys’s story leaves out many of the
details. But I think that it’s generally true. It seems to me that the New Deal
Justices left us with what Cass Sunstein has called an “incompletely theorized
agreement.”27 Rational basis review left Congress with immense power, but
avoided an official abdication of judicial review. Lopez, Morrison, and with time,
Raich, disambiguate the agreement. The Supreme Court has said, in broad
strokes, that we have to live with immense congressional power and that the
Supreme Court will never abdicate its power of judicial review.
S.M.
22
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Steve,
I think we disagree in part. It sounds like you’re pretty much willing to do
away with talk of “federalism” and chalk it all up to enumeration. Hence your
complaints about Morrison. I grant that you’re surely right thatfederalism talk
need not, and perhaps should not, play any direct role in analyzing the
Constitution’s text, given that any interest in federalism is already reflected in the
methodology of enumeration. Our own Iowa City’s Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
ordinance,28 for example, should pose no legal obstacle to a federal military
installation that stores and maintains nuclear weapons, provided that the facility is
otherwise constitutionally established.29 Federal power trumps Statedignity when
it exists.30
But from a broader perspective your position is too dismissive.
Federalism is the background for sober enumerated powers analysis. The
distributions of decision-making authority in the Constitution are a reflection of a
government marked by “dual sovereignty,” as Justice Kennedy has put it.31 Think
about Iraq today: a federal government with three separate “States” (Kurds,
Shitite, and Sunni/Shiite mix in the middle). Won’t the power of the central
government there necessarily have to be limited so as to allow governing
autonomy in the “States” so that religious, cultural, and economic differences can
continue to be reflected? In this sense, Iraq is not much different that the original
American union of disparate colonial interests, where decentralized diversity was
the political price of military and economic unification.32

28

Iowa City, IA City Code, Title 6, Ch. 5, §§ 6-5-3 (“Nuclear Weapons Work Prohibited. No
person shall knowingly engage in work within the city, the purpose of which is the development,
production, deployment, launching, maintenance or storage of nuclear weapons or components of
nuclear weapons”) and 6-5-5 (making violation a “simple misdemeanor or municipal infraction”
and creating a private civil action in city residents to enforce the provision), available at
http://66.113.195.234/IA/Iowa%20City/index.htm (last accessed 6 January 2006).
29
U.S. CONST. Art I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To … provide for the common
Defense ….”), cl. 11 (“… [t]o raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that
use shall be for a longer Term than two Years”), cl. 12 (“… [t]o provide and maintain a Navy”),
and cl. 13 (“… [t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces”).
30
See Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2213 (“Just as acquiescence to federal regulation cannot expand the
bounds of the Commerce Clause, [citation omitted], so too State action cannot circumscribe
Congress’[s] plenary commerce power [citation and footnote omitted]”).
31
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 840 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
32
See generally Akhil R. Amar AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 43-53 (Random House
2005) (arguing that the central motivations behind the establishment of the Constitution of 1789
were deeply geopolitical—the need for military and economic unity in the face of potential
invasion or interference by, and economic competition from, European imperial powers).
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At bottom, the Supreme Court’s holdings in Lopez and Morrison purport
to give enumeration some teeth as a true limit. Why? Because of the federalism
roots of the enumeration methodology itself. Chief Justice Rehnquist was eager,
and correctly so, to note in Morrison that the framers “[d]epart[ed] from their
parliamentary past,” and “adopted a written Constitution that further divided
authority at the federal level so that the Constitution’s provisions would not be
defined solely by the political branches nor the scope of legislative power limited
only by public opinion and the Legislature’s self-restraint.”33 Congress is not
Parliament; it was not meant to have the powers of a unitary government; and any
constitutional doctrine that gives Congress completely plenary powers (or, what is
really the same, the power to define its powers) is at loggerheads with the primal
principle of enumerated, and therefore limited, federal power. My guess is that
the Justices are trying to enforce limits with a view to, but without explicitly
incorporating, the States’ interests and extratextual federalism principles.
In short, I think that there really is a vague, weak kind of judicial
federalism at work in these cases. I gather from what you’ve written that you take
a dim view of it, but why should you? If the federalism at work is really as
demure as I have cast it, why fret about the Supreme Court’s taking a moment to
reflect on the framers’ emphatic rejection of unitary government and their quite
deliberate choices to distribute decision-making powers in certain ways and to
specific levels of government?
Regards,
R.B.

Professor Bezanson,
There’s nothing wrong with careful attention to history, but the Supreme
Court doesn’t have license to restructure the government with substantive
federalism principles. I concede that it has to draw lines based on enumeration in
the text, but it cannot draw them just anywhere. Conservative talismans like
“federalism” and “separation of powers” don’t actually appear anywhere within
the four corners of the Constitution. A Supreme Court decision that redefines
Congress’s powers trifles with democracy, and so it should be grounded in an
intellectually coherent account of the Constitution’s text and the very real regime
that it creates. That said, surely the Morrison majority was right to Statethat
every commerce regulation the court had sustained up to up to Lopez regulated
some activity that was either “economic” in some attenuated sense or that had

33
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substantial effects on interstate commerce.34 I think you can articulate a
distinction between raising crops like wheat and marijuana on the one hand
(economic) and acts of violence on the other (noneconomic), but the ghost of
Justice Holmes looms large: given that one can draw a distinction, the relevant
question is why he or she should draw it.35 I just don’t see anything coherent here.
It’s all ad hoc. So even if judicial review isn’t presumptively illegitimate in this
area, Lopez and Morrison don’t coherently reconstruct Article I, section 8. Or am
I asking for too much?
S.M.
Steve,
I think you’re beating something of a straw man. Of course I agree that
interpreting constitutional language to get at substantive results is illegitimate,
even when the result in question is some unquestionably relevant abstraction like
“federalism” or “separation of powers.” The specific purposes of the framers and
the ratifying population matter. But the problem with this vague formulation is
that exactly nine Justices on the Supreme Court are sure to agree with it. It verges
on tautology; it’s not a useful tool for gaining purchase on the Court’s work.
Perhaps something like the following analysis is more helpful. The
Justices, I think, paused to reflect on the original reasons for the enumeration of
Congress’s powers in the Constitution. The test we have after Morrison does not
literally incorporate some formulation like “traditional Stateconcern” as one of its
elements.36 It this minimal sense, they didn’t use independent State(model (1))
concepts of federalism as part of their gloss on Article I. Lopez and Morrison are
quite noticeably distinct from the now-repudiated Fair Labor Standards Act case,
Nationa League of Cities v. Usery, and the Eleventh Amendment cases, which use
independent Stateconcepts in this sense .37 Rather, the majority opinions in both
cases refer to or mention them as illustrative of the nature of the federalism
34

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.
See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., “The Path of the Law,” in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1897).
36
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-13 (elaborating four factor test).
37
Usery, 426 U.S. at 845 (“… there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every State
government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an
affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution
prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner) (emphasis added); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 730 (1999) (“To rest on the words of the [Eleventh] Amendment alone would be to
engage in the type of ahistorical literalism we have rejected in interpreting the scope of the States'
sovereign immunity since the discredited decision in Chisholm [v. Georgia]” (citing Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68, 69 (1996). See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997) (holding that Conrgess may not by statute require State executive agencies to implement
federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not by
statute require State legislatures to implement federal law by enacting legislation).
35
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interests supposedly codified in the original enumeration.38 One can believe that
Lopez and Morrison are technically wrong without embracing the fairly radical
idea that mere reference to federalism concerns is illegitimate when those
concerns are not explicit in the Constitution’s text. Surely you are not claiming
that every invocation of extratextual federalism is inappropriate on democracy
grounds, either historically, as a matter textual principles and purposes, or
practically. If you are, then wouldn’t you have to give up any robust reading of
the Bill of Rights, and any further extension of individual constitutional rights
claims? The First Amendment and substantive due process cases are brimming,
even more so than the federalism cases, with extratextual principles, and the Court
invokes these principles to upset democratic political outcomes.39
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
I’ll answer your straw man with a dead horse. Courts aren’t elected, but
courts don’t need to be elected legitimately to do some things. Invoking
extratextual principles to police illegitimate violations of legal rules established to
protect the natural and human rights of individuals is clearly different than
invoking extratextual principles to restructure the powers of government. The
Constitution is a document of the Eighteenth Century. Its electric current is the
rhetoric of individual rights and policing the abuse of government power.40 The
Bill of Rights records and memorializes these rights as strong prohibitions on
government conduct. It seems impossible for a legal document to capture the full
meaning of the rights the Constitution is supposed to protect. Thus, the Supreme
Court must invoke extratextual principles. Those invoked by Justice Chase in
Calder v. Bull41or by the “established method” of the substantive due process
cases42 provide imperfect legal definition to these rights. Unless one is willing to
38

We mean to invoke something like the use/mention distinction that is popular in analytic
philosophy. Simon Blackburn, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 387 (Oxford 1996)
(“use/mention distinction The distinction between using a word, such as ‘cat’, to talk about cats,
and mentioning the word, as one would if pointing out that ‘cat’ has three letters. The distinction
becomes important when the possibility of mistaking use and mention arises, and philosophers
often like to believe that those who do not share their views have made such a confusion”).
39
Indeed, this is a primary area of complaint from conservative Justices, see, e.g., Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40
See generally Bernard Bailyn, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(Enlarged Edition) (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1992); Bernard Bailyn, TO BEGIN
THE WORLD ANEW: THE GENIUS AND AMBIGUITIES OF THE AMERICA FOUNDERS (Knopf 2003).
41
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 -389 (1798) (Chase, J., seriatim).
42
At the very least this method entails “protect[ing] those fundamental rights and liberties which
are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,’[citations omitted] and
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
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throw out the centrality of individual rights to the constitutional experiment (I am
not), then extratextual principles are unavoidable in the individual liberties
context.
By contrast, the division of power between the federal and State
governments serves only instrumental ends. Whereas individual rights are ends in
themselves, structural principles are not. We do not place limits on the regulatory
powers of the federal government because the State governments are like
individual rights holders.43 State governments are creations of “we, the people”
as well. If so, then enumeration shouldn’t amount to anything more than
enumeration: the extratextual principles invoked to restrict Congress’s power to
govern the States must themselves be only instrumental. That is, they must be
procedural or structural, not substantive, as they are in Usery or in the Eleventh
Amendment context. The Supreme Court should not invoke extratextual
principles merely to freeze into place particular political settlements or
institutional arrangements, unless those principles unambiguously indicate that
the historic arrangement is instrumentally necessary for the perpetuation of the
constitutional regime. In other words, I’m loudly objecting to your independent
States model of federalism, because it treats federalism problems like individual
rights problems.
We don’t do that in the separation of power context. Consider, for
example, the Commander in Chief Clause.44 Surely this clause, like the
Commerce Clause, is governed by enumeration-based limits. Plainly,however,
the clause does not exist in order to preserve the Stateof military science in 1789.
Nuclear weapons, stealth bombers, and aircraft carriers give the President vast,
imperial powers—powers that surely would alarm the framers. Yet it would be
legally absurd to interpret the words “Army” and “Navy” not to authorize the
President to use these weapons on the theory that they are, for constitutional
purposes, “nonarmy” and “nonnavy.” By and large, the Justices appear to have
no such plans for the Commerce Clause. Gun regulation, for some purposes, is
off limits, but medical marijuana is not. Unless we have a significantly more
radical project of this kind, then we are adrift without guiding principle—we have
were sacrificed,’ [citation omitted]” and “the … fundamental liberty interest” in which can be
“‘careful[ly] descri[bed]’” by reference to “[o]ur Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices,”
Washington v. Glucksberg 521 U.S. 702, 720-721 (1997) (citations omitted). It is not clear to
what extent Lawrence v. Texas relaxes either the traditional characterization requirement or the
strength of the required historical pedigree for new substantive due process rights, see, e.g.,
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72.
43
But see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (explicitly discussing waiver of State
sovereign immunity in federal court as “the surrender of constitutional rights”)
44
U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and the militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service
of the United States ….”).
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essentially ad hoc limits on the commerce power. Except for Justice Thomas45,
there is no new federalism.
S.M.
Steve,
You’re being somewhat unfair. The Commerce Clause cases aren’t really
ad hoc. Or, at least, Gonzales v. Raich46 shows that they don’t have to be. I grant
you that except for Justice Scalia’s concurrence in the judgment, the opinions are
pretty uninteresting. Justice Stevens is at his muddied best—it is impossible to
pin down his holding. Can Congress legislate by categories or is there a required
jurisdictional element in as applied cases? I have absolutely no idea from reading
the opinion. And I have not seen Perez47 cited so much or so singularly ever
before. Justice O'Connor offers up much the same thing. Where does this fuzzy
lingo about historic spheres of sovereignty, encroachment, States as laboratories,
and federalism as structural liberty all fit into a clear and coherent idea, principle,
doctrine, or rule? I would say that she hasn’t got the foggiest idea. I don’t,
frankly, see the Court returning to Usery any time soon. Justice Thomas, as you
note, is on his own.
It’s Justice Scalia’s concurrence in the judgment48 that speaks to our
disagreement. He sees the case as an enumerated powers case, not one about
federalism or state sovereignty. The case presents a simple question about the
extent of Congress's legislative power under Article I; Congress has the power to
enact the Controlled Substances Act provision prohibiting intrastate, medical use
of marijuana because that regulation is necessary and proper to achieving a
concededly permissible regulatory purpose under Congress’s core Commerce
Clause powers—prohibiting the interstate market in marijuana.49 One could, of
course, make the argument that the regulation was actually unnecessary because
its contents could easily be extracted from the federal law without compromising
the Controlled Substances Act’s effectiveness, but for one reason or another this
argument didn’t wash.50 In itself this is interesting for Justice Scalia—it is
45

125 S.Ct. at 2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
125 S.Ct. at 2195.
47
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding federal statute criminalizing “loan
sharking” on the theory that the activity has substantial effects on interStatecommerce).
48
125 S.Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
49
See United States v. Darby , 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. Sullivan , 332 U.S. 689
(1948).
50
See Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2207-09; the converse of this proposition is also a live issue. The
distinction between regulations that regulate intrastate economic activity because that activity has
a substantial effect on interstate commerce and those that regulate intrastate noneconomic activity
because it is a necessary part of a large federal regulatory framework, has never been so clearly
expressed as in Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Raich. Assuming the Supreme Court adopts his
46
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deferential, it rings of McCullough v. Maryland, and it balances interests.51 But I
take it his point is very simple: there was no federalism issue in the case.
This position, however, is not necessarily inconsistent with the weak form
of extratextual federalism in Lopez and Morrison. Perhaps Justice Scalia simply
believes that when Congress has established a larger framework for regulating
interstate commerce under its undisputed power, deference under McCulloch and
the Necessary and Proper Clause is appropriate. In other words, I think you’re
presenting a false dichotomy. The alternative to the dissenters’ views in Raich is
not necessarily your own brand of liberal federalism.
Regards,
R.B.
II. THE MOVING TARGET: SOVEREIGNTY
Professor Bezanson,
I disagree. Justice Scalia endorsed a theory of sovereignty in U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton52 that is I think is inconsistent with the lukewarm
view, we think one might be able to challenge individual statutes on the theory that they bear no
relationship to any legitimate larger scheme of regulation of the channels or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. In other words, the law in question might now have to be sufficiently
“schematic,” by some definition, to enable Congress to avoid the argument that it is simply
interfering with State affairs. The interesting implication is for some federal criminal provisions.
Congress has a habit of legislating away one problem at a time, leaving us, in some areas, with a
patchwork quilt of statutory provisions that have no evident collective purpose, let alone anything
like a “schematic” character. See Alex Kreit, Why is Congress Still Regulating Noncommercial
Activity?, 28 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 169, 198 (2004) (advocating such a standard: “first, the
broader scheme must be targeted at a commercial enterprise; second, the regulated actors or
entities must be performing the specific activity as part of the enterprise”; and stating this “broader
scheme analysis would be employed in substantial effects cases for statutes that fail the four prong
Morrison test”). Take, for example, the recent federal law that added killing a fetus to a broad
range of federal criminal statutes resting on, e.g., the commerce power, see Unborn Victims of
Violence Act, 18 U.S.C. 1841 (2004). Under Raich the government might well have difficulty
arguing that the fetus section was in any way related to the larger schematic of the range of federal
criminal laws, which generally serve to protect specific governmental regulatory or institutional
interests, like the national banking system.
51
Justice Scalia is famously interested in rulesof law. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U CIN. L REV. 849 (1989); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Burnham v. Super. Ct. of California, 495 U.S. 604, 626-27
(1990) (arguing that Justice Brennan’s proposed test for personal jurisdiction, which relied a
number of factors to determine whether to subject a transient defendant to process, was
conceptually flawed: “Thus, despite the fact that he manages to work the word ‘rule’ into his
formulation, Justice BRENNAN's approach does not establish a rule of law at all, but only a
‘totality of the circumstances’ test, guaranteeing what traditional territorial rules of jurisdiction
were designed precisely to avoid: uncertainty and litigation over the preliminary issue of the
forum's competence”).
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federalism of his Raich concurrence. Term Limits involved a challenge to an
Arkansas Stateconstitutional provision that imposed term limits on candidates for
Congress. The Supreme Court struck down the provision on the theory that the
States shouldn’t be permitted to interfere with the election of the federal
legislature.53 Justice Thomas dissented on the opposing theory that “[n]othing in
the Constitution deprives the people of each Stateof the power to prescribe
eligibility requirements for … candidates …. it raises no bar to action by the
States or the people.”54 Justice Thomas’s dissent is backed up by a theory of
political power and sovereignty: “the people of the States,” he argues, “need not
point to any affirmative grant of power in the Constitution in order to prescribe”
laws that affect the federal government, because “[t]he ultimate source of the
Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not
the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.”55 On one
level this is an argument about governmental immunities. On another, it is an
image of constitutional power. It’s something that flows from a source—like
water, sound, or electricity. What’s important is tracing power back to the source.
Justice Thomas finds the source in the Article VII ratification procedure:
“The Constitution took effect once it had been ratified by the people gathered in
convention in nine different States. But the Constitution went into effect only
‘between the States so ratifyi ng the same,’ … it did not bind the people of North
Carolina until they had accepted it. In Madison's words, the popular consent upon
which the Constitution's authority rests was ‘given by the people, not as
individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and
independent States to which they respectively belong.’” 56 Justice Thomas has

52

514 U.S. 779, 845 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, J., and
Scalia, J.).
53
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 783.
54
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
55
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
56
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 846 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 243 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed. 1961); J. Elliot, ed. 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 94 (2nd ed. 1876); Justice Thomas’s footnote to this
proposition may be even more important. He argues: “The ringing initial words of the
Constitution – ‘We the People of the United States’ – convey something of the same idea. (In the
Constitution, after all, the ‘United States’ is consistently a plural noun.) The Preamble that t he
Philadelphia Convention approved before sending the Constitution to the Committee of Style is
even clearer. It began: ‘We the people of the States of New -Hampshire, Massachusetts, RhodeIsland and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvannia,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia ….’ Scholars have
suggested that the Committee of Style adopted the current language because it was not clear that
all the States would actually ratify the Constitution. In this instance, I agree with the majority that
the Committee’s edits did not work a substantive change in the Constitution.”
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argued that “the people of the several States are the only true source of power.” 57
And so the Tenth Amendment, I gather, is an express articulation of this view
rather than a tautological confirmation of enumeration: “As far as the Federal
Constitution is concerned, then, the States can exercise all powers that the
Constitution does not withhold from them and they are constitutionally supreme.
All power may be traced to them. The Federal Government and the States thus
face different default rules: Where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of
a particular power – that is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly
or by necessary implication – the Federal Government lacks that power and the
States enjoy it.”58 The unstated premise of Justice Thomas’s claim, I gather, is
that our ability to trace, ex post, the lines of delegation is what really matters
when deciding whether Congress has some power. That’s not what we’re saying
Justice Scalia’s Raich concurrence says—he’s clearer than Justice Stevens, but
Scalia still muddies the waters.
S.M.
Steve,
I’m intrigued. Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas in Term Limits, but I
don’t know that he’s ever expressed anything quite this strong in his own voice.
It’s best to remember that a Supreme Court Justice doesn’t necessarily agree with
every logical implication of every opinion he or she joins. Perhaps a
disagreement between Justices Scalia and Thomas (and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
whose votes track Thomas’s in both cases) was submerged in Term Limits.59 I
have never thought that Justice Scalia is especially committed to returning the
Constitution from exile. But what, exactly, is the character of the disagreement
we’ve identified? What is, or what would be, the counterview that permits Scalia
to concur in Raich?
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
It’s hard to say. Perhaps from Justice Thomas’s perspective, the problem
with Scalia’s opinion in Raich is just that it muddies the ultimate sources of
sovereignty. Justice Scalia’s federal power to regulate intrastate noneconomic
activity as long as there is a larger regulatory framework is a creature without
obvious genealogy. It’s difficult to trace to its origin. It is as if Justice Thomas
57

Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 847 (citing and quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (Black,
J., plurality opinion) (“‘The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and
authority have no other source’”) (Thomas omits footnote).
58
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 847-48 (emphasis added).
59
Another instance of an incompletely theorized agreement, perhaps? See Sunstein, supra, at note
22.
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believes that one must have a Parliament or a delegatee legislature, but not both.
In effect, Justice Scalia strives to avoid this momentous choice. He gives us
neither Parliament nor elemental, foundational, original States. Some kind of
legislative Chimera. Perhaps he simply cares a great deal less about tracing the
strands of delegation and properly characterizing Congress than does Justice
Thomas.
But I think that’s somewhat inconsistent for Justice Scalia. His separation
of powers jurisprudence devotes a great deal of care to abstract questions of
authority and the characterization of government power. Let’s call this
constitutional “formalism.” A formalist, in this sense, “generally assume[s] that
the Constitution recognizes three kinds of functions—legislative, executive, and
judicial—that must be assigned to the corresponding branch of government,” so
that “separation-of-powers issues turn largely on the classification of functions.”60
This bears a close relation to late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century legal
formalism.61 Perhaps it’s the same thing.
In any event, Justice Scalia’s dissents in the independent counsel statute
case, Morrison v. Olson,62 and the first Sentencing Guidelines case, Mistretta v.
United States ,63 focus on the correct abstract characterization of the government
60

Jesse Choper, Richard Fallon, Jr., Yale Kamisar, and Steven Shiffrin, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS (9th Edition) 155 (West 2003) (citing Peter Strauss, The Place
of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
573 (1984) and Rebecca Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513, 1522-31 (1991)).
61
Gerald Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View form Century’s End, 49
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1999) (“The formalists clearly believed that the law was comprised of
principles—including definitions, concepts, and doctrines—broad in their generality, few in their
number, and clear enough to permit answers to the questions of law to be more or less directly
deduced. The formalists also believed that the law generally is, and should be, unresponsive to
particular factual contexts and circumstances. They wrote as if such principles had an existence of
their own, quite apart from what judges or legislators might actually have said or done, and that
these principles were valid on grounds that were indifferent to what we have come to see as either
the needs of society or the purposes that law might serve. Although such principles might develop
and evolve over time, they did not do so in accordance with society's changing needs. Neither
were they influenced by custom and practice nor by what people might ‘feel’ to be ‘just’”)
(footnotes omitted).
62
Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting from decision to uphold as
constitutional the Independent Counsel Statute’s provision for termination for “good cause”); see
id., 699 (quoting the Article II Vesting Clause and stating: “That is what this suit is about. Power.
The allocation of power among Congress, the President, and the courts in such fashion as to
preserve the equilibrium the Constitution sought to establish--so that ‘a gradual concentration of
the several powers in the same department,’ Federalist No. 51, p. 321 (J. Madison), can effectively
be resisted.
63
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting from decision to
uphold as constitutional the Sentencing Reform Act’s establishment of the United States
Sentencing Commission) (“I dissent from today’s decision because I can find no place within our
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powers at issue.64 I’m associating Justice Scalia with the mode of argument that
appears in the opinions for the Court in Nixon v.United States 65, INSv. Chada 66,
Clinton v. New York67, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.68, Dames &
Moore v. Regan,69 and Youngstown Steel Sheet & Tube Co.70 The muchdiscussed “unitary executive” theory, too.71 The common feature here is that
formalism is not a context-sensitive approach. It relies on the courts to enforce
clearly drawn, bright-line boundaries between governmental institutions and
powers. And we can see that attitude heartily at work in Scalia’s dissents in
Olsen and Mistretta, and Thomas’s dissent in Term Limits. All three opinions
treat power as the plenary right to operate within a defined space—that’s the
metaphor here, room to act, and to do whatever one wants within bounded limits.
I think it is fair to label Justice Scalia a formalist in this sense. It’s an attitude
that’s hostile to the Necessary and Proper Clause, so why not then label his Raich
concurrence, and its reliance on implied powers and federal interests, an
inconsistency? Why should the same Constitution that provides a springboard for
formalist analysis in the separation of powers context be read any differently in
the federalism context?
Sincerely,
S.M.
Steve,
I’d guess that you really mean to say that it shouldn’t be. And that Justice
Scalia should abandon his formalist ways for the alternative: “functionalism,”
constitutional system for an agency created by Congress to exercise no governmental power other
than the making of laws”).
64
See also Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 815 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (holding that an interested party in a lawsuit may not be appointed to
prosecute indirect criminal contempt proceedings; Justice Scalia concurred on a strict separation of
powers theory, and would have held that officials of the judicial branch cannot initiate such
prosecutions, but may only refer potential prosecutions to the executive branch).
65
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
66
INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
67
Clinton v. City of New York (Line Item Veto Case), 524 U.S. 417 (1997).
68
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
69
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
70
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
71
See generally Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First
Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (Summer 1997); Steven G. Calabresi and
Christopher Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second Half-Century, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 667 (Summer 2003); Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher Yoo, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1
(Nov. 2004); Christopher Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, and Anthony Colangelo, The Unitary
Executive in the Modern Era, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601 (Jan. 2005); see John Yoo, THE POWERS OF
WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (University of Chicago
press 2005).
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which “takes as its foundational commitment the different but equally familiar
ideal of ‘checks and balances’” and argues that “there can be no rigid division of
governmental functions into three sharp categories, each the distinctive province
of a single branch of government” so that “actions and institutional arrangements
should be measured by reference to … characteristic functions of the separation of
powers.”72 That is, what is separating the powers supposed to do?73
But I think that Justice Scalia’s views are more subtle than you’re letting
on. Why must he err everywhere for erring once? Furthermore I think one can
make the case that Justice Thomas has more or different formalistic commitments.
For example, in Term Limits Justice Thomas coyly suggested that Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transport Association, which repudiated Usery, was
wrongly decided and flatly Stated that the Term Limits majority misinterpreted
McCulloch when it argued that the Constitution implies a prohibition on Statemandated electorial qualifications for congressional candidates because the Tenth
Amendment delegates all powers that aren’t at least mentioned in the text.74 This
is not quite Justice Scalia’s structural formalism, which I take to be exemplified
by his dissent in the independent counsel case, Morrison v. Olsen.
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
Maybe you have a point. In a 2004 Spending Clause case called Sabri v.
United States , the Supreme Court upheld the federal statute criminalizing bribery
of State, local, or tribal officials when the program receives at least $10,000 in

72

Jesse Choper, Richard Fallon, Jr., Yale Kamisar, and Steven Shiffrin, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS (9th Edition) 155 (footnote omitted)..
73
As we are using the term “functionalism,” it would encompass the Supreme Court’s deferential,
interest-balancing approach in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 316 . Justice Jackson’s famous
concurrence in Youngstown Steel Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634
(Jackson, J., “concurring in the judgment and the opinion of the court”), comes to mind.
74
Term Limits, at 852-853 (Thomas, J.) (specifically referring to Garcia and arguing that “[w]hen
[the Supreme Court is] asked to decide whether a congressional statute that appears to have been
authorized by Article I is nonetheless unconstitutional because it invades a protected sphere of
Statesovereignty, it may well be appropriate for [the Court] to inq uire into what [it] ha[s] called
the ‘traditional aspects of State sovereignty’” and arguing that the Term Limits majority’s reliance
on MuCulloch v. Maryland “is misplaced” because while “McCulloch did make clear that a power
need not be ‘expressly’ delegated to the United States or prohibited to the States in order to fall
outside the Tenth Amendment's reservation” it is nevertheless the case that “McCulloch did not
qualify this observation by indicating that the question also turned on whether the States had
enjoyed the power before the framing. To the contrary, McCulloch seemed to assume that the
people had ‘conferred on the general government the power contained in the constitution, and on
the States the whole residuum of power’”).
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federal funds as an exercise of the Spending Clause.75 In that case, Justice
Thomas concurred in the judgment.76 He would have upheld the statute as a valid
exercise of the commerce power.77 He disagreed, however, with the majority’s
conclusion that the statute was a valid exercise of the spending power.
Specifically, he argued that the statute could not be justified as a necessary and
proper extension of the Spending Clause power because it ran afoul of the Court’s
test for applying the Necessary and Proper Clause: the law must be “‘plainly
adapted’” to some permissible end enumerated in Article I.78 Justice Thomas
proposed his own test for determining whether a statute is “plainly adapted”: “it
would seem,” he wrote, “necessary to show some obvious, simple and direct
relation between the statute and the enumerated power.”79 That isn’t rational
basis. And it isn’t nearly as deferential as Justice Scalia is in Raich. So perhaps
there’s a distinction to be drawn. Could it really just be about judicial review?
Cheers,
S.M.
III. SOVEREIGNTY DIVIDED: A FRACTURED FEDERALISM
Steve,
Quite possibly. But let’s shift gears for a bit. With all this talk of the
conservative view in Term Limits, I wonder if the majority opinion is any more
coherent. I don’t think so. Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court doesn’t answer
the most important question in the case. Nothing about either the existence of a
national Constitution or the concept of enumerated powers compels him to strike
down the Arkansas constitutional amendment at issue in Term Limits. Justice
Stevens States that the “State-imposed restriction is contrary to the ‘fundamental
principle of our representative democracy,’ embodied in the Constitution, that ‘the
people should choose whom they please to govern them,’”80 but stating and
proving are different things. Furthermore, this particular formulation is deeply
question-begging: the conclusion (that the Constitution is a unifying document of
the whole people) is part of the premise (that the Constitution is an act of
delegation by the whole people). And it almost has the ring of unitary
government to it and I think we both agree that Chief Justice Rehnquist is right to
say that that’s not what the Constitution establishes.
75

Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
Sabri, 541 U.S. at 610 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
77
Sabri, 541 U.S. at 614 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
78
Sabri, 541 U.S. at 612 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415).
79
Sabri, 541 U.S. at 613 (quoting just previous to the quoted text to WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 898 (1991)).
80
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 783 (citing and quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547
(1969)).
76
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True, Justice Stevens invokes Powell v. McCormack81 and the John
Wilkes affair,82 but these examples are less illuminating than one might think. In
the Powell case, Congress voted to “exclude” a member accused of financial
improprieties before he was seated by majority vote rather than to “expel” him
after he was seated by the constitutionally mandated two-thirds vote.83 The
Supreme Court, in effect, ordered the House of Representatives to seat him.84 Mr.
Wilkes was a Member of Parliament in the Seventeenth Century, who printed his
criticism of a Franco-British treaty; Wilkes’s scurrilous journalism “earned [him]
a conviction for seditious libel,” nearly two years in prison, and expulsion from
Parliament.85 Wilkes’s district repeatedly re-elected him to his seat; Parliament
repeatedly prevented him from taking it; and eventually, Wilkes’s political
fortunes reversed and “the House of Commons voted to expunge the resolutions
that had expelled [him] and had declared him ineligible, labeling those prior
resolutions ‘subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this
kingdom.’”86
Justice Stevens also reviewed American historical materials. He cites The
Federalist for the proposition that the “plan of the Constitutional Convention did
not contemplate ‘an entire consolidation of the States into one complete national
sovereignty,’ but only a partial consolidation in which ‘the Stategovernments
would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and
which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States.’” 87 But
that principle doesn’t really answer the Tenth Amendment argument. Justice
Stevens gets to the heart of his argument when he invokes McCulloch v.
Maryland to argue that “the text of the Tenth Amendment draws a basic
distinction between the powers of the newly created Federal Government and the
powers retained by the pre-existing sovereign States. As Chief Justice Marshall
explained, ‘it was neither necessary nor proper to define the powers retained by
the States. These powers proceed, not from the people of America, but from the
people of the several States; and remain, after the adoption of the constitution,
what they were before, except so far as they may be abridged by that
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Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 788-90.
83
Powell, 395 U.S. at 489-93; U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 5, cl. 1, 2.
84
Powell, 395 U.S. at 549-50 (ordering retroactive reinstatement—Mr. Powell had already been
elected to the next Conrgess, which was already underway when the Supreme Court reviewed the
case).
85
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 789-90.
86
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 790.
87
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 801 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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instrument.’”88 Stevens surely has the winning argument here. The powers of the
State governments are, constitutionally, what they are. They were created by the
act of ratification no less then the federal government’s powers were. So
someone claiming Statepower unde r the Tenth Amendment has to point to
somehting more than simply the fact of omission from the four corners of the
Constitution to make a really compelling Tenth Amendment argument. If this
isn’t true, then McCulloch was wrongly decided,89 and Justice Thomas’s
arguments in Sabri and Raich were not too extreme but rather too moderate.
But this is all rather beside the point. Justice Stevens has got to point to
something more than the text as well, because the Qualifications Clause doesn’t
obviously forbid the States from establishing additional qualifications for
congressional candidates. In some sense, he has got to be saying that the States
shouldn’t have that power. He must look into the murky depths to divine what is
properly among the original retained powers of the States. Inscrutable common
law judging, that.
But in this respect, Justice Stevens is fairly straightforward about what the
Court is doing. Justice Stevens argues that pointing to the missing prohibition on
additional qualifications “overlooks the revolutionary character of the
Government that the Framers conceived,” because “the Framers were presented
with, and eventually adopted a variation of, ‘a plan not merely to amend the
Articles of Confederation but to create an entirely new National Government with
a National Executive, National Judiciary, and a National Legislature.’ In adopting
that plan, the Framers envisioned a uniform national system, rejecting the notion
that the Nation was a collection of States, and instead creating a dir ect link
between the National Government and the people of the United States.” 90 That is,
the Constitution creates what the Articles didn’t: a national legislature.91 And the
States can’t interfere with the structural rules that create and constitute that
88

Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 801 (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193
(1819)) (emphasis added). Justice Thomas took issue with this argument in the context of
McCulloch, see note 58, supra.
89
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 801 (quoting Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat. ) at 436) (In that case, “the
Court rejected the argument that the Constitution's silence on the subject of Statepower to tax
corporations chartered by Congress implies that the States have ‘reserved’ power to tax such
federal instrumentalities. ‘[An] ‘original right to tax’ such federal entities ‘never existed, and the
question whether it has been surrendered, cannot arise.” The very next sentence of the Court’s
decision is even clearer. “In language that presaged Justice Story's argument, Chief Justice
Marshall concluded: ‘This opinion does not deprive the States of any resources which they
originally possessed’”).
90
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 803.
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See Amar, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 57-64 (arguing that the Congress created
by the Constitution of 1789 was qualitatively different than that created by the Articles of
Confederation, in that, among other things, it had “‘legislative’” powers and could enact “‘law,’”
which the Article Congress did not have and could not do).
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legislature. That’s a pragmatic, almost common-law, approach to this problem. It
makes a great deal of sense to me, and, I suspect, to you. It’s also a lot more
satisfying than ghostly appeals to sovereignty.
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
Well, surely the Term Limits majority is right to say that Representatives
are federal officers—even though they are “chosen by separate constituencies”
they become “servants of the people of the United States” when elected, as
opposed to mere “delegates appointed by separate, sovereign States.” 92 Perhaps
this rhetoric is the handmaiden to your eminently pragmatic point—if we didn’t
act as if the office of Representative were essentially federal in character, the
States would effectively control the membership of the House. But I think there’s
something more complicated at work here.
The Term Limits Court rejected Justice Thomas’s more specific argument
that “because the States ratified the Constitution, the people can delegate power
only through the States or b y acting in their capacities as citizens of particular
States”; rather, the Court maintained, the Constitution “was submitted to the
whole people” of the country—who only met in separate places to complete the
act of ratification.93 I think it’s fair to say that Justice Thomas believes the
ratification effected a one-directional delegation. Power goes from the people as
citizens of the States to the federal government. Indeed, Justice Thomas sees
evidence for his bottom-up approach in the fact the Constitution provides for no
election of any officer by the whole people of the nation—every election, even the
presidential election, is mediated through the citizen’s citizenship of a State.94
But Justice Stevens sees something different in the fact that the States retain their
salience in the Constitution’s election scheme: complex layers of delegation and
redelegation. The ratifying population delegated the power to hold federal
elections to the federal level by ratifying the Constitution, and through the
Constitution they were re-delegated a second time to the States— that is, the
conduct of elections was “delegated to, rather than reserved by, the States .”95
Is there anything but a choice between dueling one-directional constructs?
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy offers a multidirectional alternative:
In one sense it is true that ‘the people of each State retained their separate
political identities,’ for the Constitution takes care both to preserve the
92

Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 838.
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 840 (quoting McCulloch, 4 Wheat. at 403) (emphasis added).
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Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 859-60 (“The Georgia citizen who is unaware of this distinction will
have it pointed out to him as soon as he tries to vote in a Massachusetts congressional election”).
95
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 804 (emphasis added).
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States and to make use of their identities and structures at various points in
organizing the federal union. It does not at all follow from this that the
sole political identity of an American is with the Stateof his or her
residence. It denies the dual character of the Federal Government which is
its very foundation to assert that the people of the United States do not
have a political identity as well, one independent of, though consistent
with, their identity as citizens of the State of their residence. It must be
recognized that ‘for all the great purposes for which the Federal
government was formed, we are one people, with one common country.’96
That is to say that “we, the people” have multiple political identities. Our States
have complex interacting sovereignties and our citizens have complex interacting
political capacities. I am inclined to side with Justice Kennedy over Justice
Stevens. The Constitution was ratified only once. In the moment of ratification,
political power didn’t flow one way or the other. The political power of the
people was singular, more or less mixed together—as in a stew. And “we, the
people” ladled it out to different agents for different purposes.
There’s much to be admired here. Surely the people have a right to see
their governments work independently within the proper bounds of their
respective constitutional charters without troublesome meddling from their
counterparts at the other level, yet equally surely, all power is not fractured, with
the federal government and the States locked into a struggle for share s of the
original delegation. I’m reminded of Professor Amar’s suggestion that the States
are meant to fight against the federal government for the rights of the people.97
And Professor Pettys’s article about “federalism’s forgotten marketplace”—
competition for hearts and minds.98 There’s something here that is intellectually
more appealing than Justice Stevens’s unitary government and Justice Thomas’s
fractured government. Law, like life, is complicated, and we shouldn’t expect the
arrows of power and delegation to point all in one direction.
Regards,
S.M.
Steve,
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Be that as it may, none of this provides any guidance to courts. I’ll hold
off on commenting about Justice Kennedy for a bit. Justice Stevens’s view in
Term Limits that the States have no power over qualifications rests ultimately on
the conclusion that the Constitution did not “delegate to” the States the power to
govern elections to federal office. There are two possible explanations for this
conclusion: (1) that the specific history of the qualifications provisions of the
Constitution supports an exclusive federal power (quite apart from the way other
power-granting provisions of the Constitution might be read); or (2) that as a
general rule all matters lying in the “shadow” of any federal power (implied
powers?) should be read as part of the federal power itself, thus pre-empting State
power, in the absence of delegation. Stevens, frankly, does not make the case for
alternative (1). Yet alternative (2) seems, to me, to be untenable and flatly
inconsistent with broad areas of doctrine, such as McCulloch, the Commerce
Clause, and the negative Commerce Clause cases, which are the stuff of balancing
and policy and necessity, and not of rules based strictly on philosophical
definitions of power. Moreover, the idea of “implied powers” (except in CurtisWright99 by some accounts) has never been accepted by the Court and was, as I
recall, pretty clearly rejected by the framers.100
Justice Stevens’s idea that “we, the people” as a whole granted,
effectively, all powers to the federal government except for a (largely federally
determined) residuum of uncertain impliedly delegated authority (not sovereignty)
to the States seems historically and politically untenable, just as Justice Thomas’s
opposite view is untenable. Enumeration, instead, consists of a workable and
instrumental form of limitation on power, not as a manifestation of sovereignty.
Of course I’ve overstated Justice Stevens’s view. But not unfairly, I think, and
for what it’s worth, doing so makes my point more graphically. More basically,
I’m struck by how irrelevant both Stevens’s and Thomas’s two source-of-power
constructs are to the result of the case. If Justice Stevens’s view is right, that
conclusion does not mean that unlimited congressional tenure is part of the
implied exclusive federal power. If Justice Thomas is right, that does not mean
that qualifications exclude length of service and thus lie within his pro-State
default rule. The constructs, to be sure, lend a certain background air to the
decisions, but nothing really specific to the resolution of the issue presented.
Add to this the fact that, practically if not politically and constitutionally,
neither the federal government nor the States look anything like the constructs
present them. In fact, in practice, and in historical pattern, our system of federal
and State governments cannot be described as consisting of one sovereign and a
bunch of delegees. Both are, or are not, sovereign in some ways. Both are
repositories of direct will from their respective polities. And in the case of the
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federal government, where the representatives, while federal in duty, are elected
locally, and where, until the Seventeenth Amendment,101 Senators were distinctly
State agents, the pattern of sovereignty is deeply ambiguous. Process-based, one
might say, rather than power-based.
As for Justice Thomas, it seems to me that he has the better of the
historical interpretations, but in the end his interpretation doesn’t compel his
default rule: literal and narrow reading of federal power with the federal
government as the delegee. Instead, it reflects the fact that at the beginning both
governments were to be “sovereign” in unforeseen ways, and to some extent each
would have to muddle through with the other against that background. The job
was to transcend differences of the narrow and regional sort in order to make a
nation. To decide the case on abstract constructs that do not at all flow from the
history, on default rules, and on the presence or absence of pre-existing power,
seems, well, silly and unecessarily ideological.
So I confess: I have a growing, healthy skepticism about pure principle
and coherent philosophy when it comes to “federalism” and its meaning. So I
have a dispute with both you and Justice Kennedy. It’s all too far removed from
practicality. We can say that there’s dual sovereignty, but it doesn’t change
anything. That Statement doesn’t explain much of the Constitution. Remember
that the framers were practical men. Maybe when it comes to federalism and
sovereignty there was no overarching conception, but instead a set of practical,
yet untested, structures that were conducive to limitation of power and a search
for accommodation and adjustment to change over time.
Sincerely,
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
I’m not quite willing as you are to dispense with sovereignty rhetoric
completely. Surely the idea of sovereignty is relevant. Surely the liberal Justices
now on the Supreme Court have done less than they might to offer a compelling
countertheory of Statesovereignty. But I think something more can be said for
their general approach of balancing federal and Stateinterests across the board. If
we adopt Justice Kennedy’s way of thinking, there’s no need to say thatthe States
get table scraps. Rather, “the people” are the ultimate source for both federal and
State sovereign power.102 They freely elect to entrust some of it to the federal
government and some to State governments. The symbol of that delegation is the
Constitution's text. Neither the federal nor State governments need be superior.
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Neither need possess ultimate sovereignty. What we have, rather, is sovereignty
divided.
It’s true that alllimits on federal power are enumerative. But it does not
follow thatState and federal power see-saw with one another. If that were true, it
would be as if the source of State constitutional power were federal
enumeration.103 The same people underlie both federal and Statepow er, but the
powers of each are conceptually independent of one another. The fact that time
and technology have elevated this constitutional provision above the others is an
argument for amending the Constitution, not bootstrapping abstract principles of
federalism into constitutional law. Thus nowadays Statesovereignty may not
mean very much in practical terms, but it remains unchanged. Nothing about the
concept of State sovereignty guarantees that it retains, or should retain, its once
strong practical importance as time progresses. I think you agree. But if you do, I
just don’t see how you can avoid conceding that some complex Kennedy-style
approach to sovereignty is valid.
Regards,
S.M.
Steve,
Now we’re getting somewhere! The subject is sovereignty and whether it
has any real or consistent meaning—and perhaps whether it should have any
meaning in the Twenty-first Century. Let me start us again from the foundations.
We want to get a handle on the essential nature of the relationship between the
federal and State“sovereigns.” What, precisely, is the union? And what are the
ground rules for dispute resolution? The concept of sovereignty matters here, but
in the United States Reports , it is selective, perhaps inconsistent, and wears many
faces. The Commerce Clause cases are cases about sovereignty only in the weak
sense that the constitutional device of enumeration is a form or manifestation of
sovereignty. Which, of course, on some level it is. The truism that federal
103
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sovereignty is confined to those powers assigned to the federal government (some
of which are shared with others: States, other public actors, private parties, and
individuals; some of which are concurrent with rival, but subordinate, powers in
the States) is, after all, true. So Lopez and Morrison are about sovereignty, but in
a largely indirect sense: the content of federal power, which is supreme when
possessed, and the interests of the losing party if that power is exceeded.
The sovereignty question gets considerably more interesting when one
shifts focus to intergovernmental immunities, and specifically to regulatory
immunities. It was here that the Court tried to define the meaning or content of
sovereignty in a long line of cases culminating in National League of Cities v.
Usery.104 There the Court effectively defined the minimum of sovereignty as a
State possessed of some measure of policy-making discretion at the legislative
level, responsible to its polity and acting in the polity’s interests; a modicum of
executive power and discretion independent of control by the federal sovereign;
and judicial authority over a range of subjects not subject to federal oversight, by
judges not subject to federal employment mandates.105 And finally, and perhaps
more importantly, a measure of power of self definition–or in an anthropomorphic
mode, some free will. The terminology employed by the Supreme Court in
service of this vision of sovereignty is too convoluted to warrant extended
recitation here—consisting as is does of “traditional functions” and such
inescapably vague terms.
In Garcia, of course, the Court pitched this stuff out and elected instead to
adopt a process-based or “structural” definition of Statesovereignty. It did so to
everyone’s, but especially liberals’, relief. States are entitled to participate in the
decisions of the federal sovereign, both by acting as a federal agent—a Senator
from a State, a signator to a compact, etc.—and as a lobbyist or advocate able to
persuade, or threaten, other federal actors. The States, in a word, are part of the
federal sovereign. The idea we’re grasping at is somewhat like the idea of one’s
forming a partnership with a corporation owned entirely by oneself. This is a bit
strange, or at least a bit at odds with a view of States and the federal government
as separate sovereigns, since one sovereign (federal) consists in part of the other.
It is hard to think of superior and subordinate relationships when the States are
both subordinate and superior. But that is an argument against the rhetoric of
dominance and antagonism more than it is a principled critique of the complex
conception of sovereignty at work in Garcia.
Garcia is strange from a purely ideological perspective, because it assigns
decision-makingpower to federal and Stategovernments by setting up “rules of
104
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the game” for a competition. At the same time it muddles the true identity of the
prevailing sovereign because the subordinate or “other” sovereign (the State) is
itself a part of the federal sovereign. Can it be that in this sense the “true” or pure
independent sovereign is the State? Perhaps. But Garcia, it seems, is more than a
decision that lays the procedural ground rules for conflict or cooperation. It
recognizes the federal sovereign as unique, truly dual in itself, and therefore not
limited by substantive areas of authority. Its acts are the acts of the State
sovereigns—the acts of the United States .
There are other aspects of the intergovernmental immunity question,
however, and it is not altogether clear that they follow the same patterns. First,
there is immunity from suit: the Eleventh Amendment and all the variations of
the theme. When can one sovereign bring another to heel under its law, privately
enforced; or in the second sovereign’s own courts; or even by the first sovereign
in its courts?106 In relation to the States, the answers to these questions, if we take
them to lie in the nature of sovereignty, seem all and ultimately to rest on
dignitary interests: the indignity of a Statebeing held liable to individuals in the
courts of the other sovereign; the indignity of a Statebeing subjected to pay ing
damages assessed under the law of the other, federal sovereign, even (or
especially) in the State’s own courts. F orced self-flagellation, that. If one runs
these ideas out to their logical extremes, one can claim that the Statesovereign
should not be subject to suit enforcing federal law against it even if the plaintiff is
the federal government itself.107 Being subject to regulation by the federal
government is one thing; being forced to comply in court is another. The
indignity of it all!
The immunity works the other way, too, both at the judicial/jurisdictional
and the regulatory (and taxing) level. But my sense is that the basic reason for
this lies elsewhere than dignity. It lies instead in power and supremacy. There is
no doubt that when the federal government acts within its power, it acts as a
whole that excludes anything else, particularly regulation at the hands of the
States. The Supremacy Clause doesn’t provide much explanation. After a brief
foray or two into language of reciprocity (States can’t tax the federal government
and likewise the federal government can’t tax the States – even Stateemployees
at one point108), all pretense of reciprocity fell away, and the immunities rule
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became the Supremacy Clause writ large.109 As with preemption,110 States have
no power to tax the federal government or its instrumentalities, but the federal
government can, if it chooses, tax the States and their instrumentalities.
So in this area of immunities, sovereignty talk whirls around the States.
But it must be a strange kind of sovereignty: very limited in reach in view of the
Supremacy Clause and very specific its definition of sovereignty. Is this the
explanation for all of the “dignity” and “respect” talk? I think States deserve
respect as governments—and fear, too—as do all governments.111 Other
governments should deal with the States carefully. I dislike self -flagellation,
compelled or not. But even with all of that, I fail to see where the idea that
dignity is the theme tying all of these things together came from, and what dignity
has to do, really, with a government that should be obeyed because it has power,
and feared for that reason too. Dignity may be part of the myth of royalty, but
States are there to serve us, to respect us, not the other way around. There may be
really good reasons for limiting suits against States, but I don’t see them as related
to dignity or even to sovereignty, as opposed to practical governance and public
policy. Under this view, the Eleventh Amendment emanates no penumbras, but
just plain words that must be obeyed, and no more.
Let me add a final word, or perhaps a final nail in the coffin, for “dignity”
under the Eleventh Amendment. Think of Ex Parte Young.112 When the States
violate federal law, don’t sue them directly for money damages. Instead sue the
State officers, in their official capacity for equitable relief, and in their private
capacity for money damages.113 This hardly comports with the State’s “dignity,”
and indeed it is arguably a greater indignity to bring a State’s governor or
legislators, for example, to answer personally for choices made (and, it should be
109
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noted, protected by eloquently waxed language in Usery114) on behalf of the State.
The State, after all, is but the collection of people and their choices in governance
at any point in time.
Another more recent version of intergovernmental immunities is the
“commandeering” rule: the federal government cannot employ the State
coercively as its agent to formulate, enforce, or adjudicate federal policy (except,
with adjudication, for the Supremacy Clause115). Commandeering is Garcia-like:
non-substantive and wholly procedural or structural, “Cross the line and you’re
out.” But it isnot a rules of negotiation or participation doctrine, as Garcia seems
to be. It is instead a line in the sand. There is no balancing of Stateand federal or
public interests here.116 It is, rather, a formal rule with a winner declared if the
rules are violated. Indeed (and evocatively), it is not even clear that a State can
agree to be commandeered, for the vice is the federal government’s misbehavior
in making policy without the stomach actually to confess to it and carry it out.
What’s going on here? Is it indignity visited on the State, or is it punishment
visited on the federal government for overreaching? Is it the presence of State
sovereignty or the absence of federal sovereignty? If it’s the former we’re back in
the land of kings and dignity as the meaning of sovereignty. If the latter we are in
the rules-laid- down territory: sovereignty means simply what one can and cannot
do, and has no larger meaning.
Regards,
R.B.

114

Usery, 426 U.S. at 854-55 (“… we have reaffirmed today that the States as States stand on a
quite different footing from an individual or a corporation when challenging the exercise of
Congress' power to regulate commerce,” a power which “Congress may not exercise that power so
as to force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct
of integral governmental functions are to be made. We agree that such assertions of power if
unchecked, would indeed, as Mr. Justice Douglas cautioned in his dissent in [Maryland v.] Wirtz,
allow ‘the National Government (to) devour the essentials of Statesovereignty,’ 392 U.S., at 205,
88 S.Ct., at 2028, and would therefore transgress the bounds of the authority granted Congress
under the Commerce Clause. While there are obvious differences between the schools and
hospitals involved in Wirtz, and the fire and police departments affected here, each provides an
integral portion of those governmental services which the States and their political subdivisions
have traditionally afforded their citizens. We are therefore persuaded that Wirtz must be
overruled”).
115
U.S. CONST. Art VI, cl.2; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). See also Gregory, 501 U.S. at
452 (which avoided the question whether to extend commandeering to Statejudges by finding that
absent “plain Statement” in law, federal age discrimination act cannot be applied to Statejudges,
and refusing to find such a Statement in the ADEA).
116
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (“where ... it is the whole object of the law to
direct the functioning of the State executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of
dual sovereignty, ... a ‘balancing’ analysis is inappropriate”).

29

Professor Bezanson,
I agree that defining sovereignty by referring to dignity isn’t of much help.
It is, as you suggest, at some level about rules. What else would a legal concept
of sovereignty be? Actually, Daniel Farber’s book, Lincoln’s Constitution,
helpfully explores the question of federal/Statesovereignty in its connection to
secession and the Civil War. He contends that there are at least three persistent
variations on the theme of State sovereignty: (1) President Abraham Lincoln’s
and Senator Daniel Webster’s strongly nationalistic view that the union was
created the very instant “we, the people” of the united colonies declared ourselves
to be independent of the King of Great Britain, and that an undivided American
people collectively ratified the present Constitution and created a fully sovereign
national government; (2) a moderated, transformative view, under which the
whole people created a government sovereign for some purposes but not for
others—the States were connected for certain purposes prior to 1789, but retained
their separate identities, which persisted in some form after ratification, and which
persist weakly to this day; and (3) Senator John C. Calhoun’s strongly
decentralized view that the States retained their full sovereignty after ratification
because the Constitution was ratified by the people in their capacities as citizens
of particular States; there is no undifferentiated American people and the States
retain enormous constitutional significance as States.117
Fair enough. Farber argues that “each of the three positions regarding
sovereignty can find some support in the historical record.”118 “[T]he ambiguity
of the historical record is more of a problem for staunch States’ rights advocates
like Jefferson and Calhoun than for nationalists like Hamilton and Lincoln.”119
Why? The “sweeping powers” of the government under the Constitution of
1789.120 States’ rights advocates have to argue uphill. Be that as it may,
Jacksonian Democrats still “succeeded in paring federal activities to a bare
minimum.”121 Thus, there is a political dimension to sovereignty talk. Or, in our
parlance, a substantive dimension. “In practical terms,” Farber claims, “the key
issue was not sovereignty but power.”122
And that’s it, isn’t it? It’s not that sovereignty is metaphysical. So is
God’s existence, but surely that’s an important question. It’s that sovereignty and
its locus have political importance. The federalist view was expressed strongly in
Marbury and McCulloch. Lots of pretty phrases about “we, the people” and the
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majesty of the Constitution.123 But I also have the sense that Statesovereignty
can be discussed with alternative political tropes, as an expression of a certain
kind of democracy. In many ways, the federal government is not especially
democratic124—indeed, in Garcia the Supreme Court cites theundemocratic
features of the federal Constitution, the Senate, the Electoral College, and the like,
to proclaim that the federal political process adequately protects the States. The
federal Constitution structures the legislative process so that federal politicians
must cater to geographic and economic interests.
The States, by contrast, have a k ind of democratic flavor. “Dignity” talk
casts the Statelegislatures as democratic in roughly th e same way that
parliamentary systems are supposed to be democratic—purely majoritarian. The
concept of representation at work is quite literal—it is what Hannah Pitkin called
“descriptive representation.”125 The State government literally resembles the
people, as the image in a mirror resembles a person.126 Thus, the dignity is the
dignity of the very people. No sophisticated layers of federalism, no Byzantine
separation of powers, just majoritarianism. Thus the literal indignity that, for
conservatives, is heaped upon the people by the Supreme Court’s decision to
strike down a law in the name of individual rights. Controversial individual rights
cases like Locke v. Davey127 and Lawrence v. Texas128 are federalism decisions
every bit as much as Printz and Garcia, in the sense that in those cases the
Supreme Court decides whether to impose federal constraints on State- level
majoritarian decision-making. Thus my fascination with Justice Chase’s
ruminations in Calder v. Bull on the nature of republican government. 129
Justice Chase rejected what the partisans of Statedignity embrace: the
idea that Stategovernment simply is majority rule in areas without federal
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preemption. That is emphatically what the federal government is not. One can
State the matter in reverse: are State governments bounded by enumeration,
cabined by constitutional restrictions, and subject to federal imposition?130
Should they be?131 Or are they like imperfect Parliaments, with defeasibly
complete legal supremacy? My own thinking is that Justice Chase shouldn’t be
cast aside. His opinion in Calder is written in the language of the great
constitutional cases: Brown v. Board, Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v.
Baird, Cohen v. California, Roe v. Wade, Texas v. Johnson, Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, and Lawrence v. Texas.132 I think we should take Professor Randy
Barnett’s libertarian critique133 of the very concept of unlimited police powers
seriously, regardless of whether we accept it.
Majoritarian dignity doesn’t compel the holdings of many (if any) of the
federalism cases,134 but it is an animating value. Perhaps it provides a motivation
to read federal power narrowly because, given the extreme importance of vox
populi, the framers and the ratifying population would never have wanted
enumerated powers to extend to this or that area. The dignitary concept of
federalism is defined vaguely, that’s almost the point. The vague rhetoric doesn’t
control the growth of legal doctrine. Rather, it informs pedestrian forms of legal
analysis. In a certain light, the logic of the Eleventh Amendment cases works
exactly like the logic of the Commerce Clause cases: enumeration controls in one
area, and the Eleventh Amendment’s gloss on Article III controls in the other.
The Supreme Court’s federalism is one of form, not substance.
That said, I don’t know what to make of Printz. I suspect, however, that
you’re right. To me, the case seems to be more about congressional overreaching
than it is about abstract State sovereignty. For that reason, Printz seems to me to
be an aberration—judicial regulation of congressional hubris at the outer edges of
130
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generally plenary federal commerce power. The core problem seems to me to be
much larger—what is it around which Printz orbits? The rationale behind Garcia
and Justice Blackmun’s rules-of-the-game approach is almost as much of a
moving target as sovereignty. It seems to me that the teaching of Garcia is that
the presence of the States in the federal decision -making process insulates federal
decisions from charges of tyranny, or heavy-handedness, in the administration of
(assumedly legitimate) federal powers. This plays on themes of procedural
justice.135 It’s almost consideration or unconscionability. Congress can’t get
more than it bargains for.
I think we’re approaching a kind of general theory of federalism. Perhaps
we can even explain the votes of a moderately conservative Justice, such as
Justice Kennedy. We can reimagine Lopez, Morrison, New York v. United States,
and Printz, as cases in which Congress got more than it bargained for. We can
reimagine Garcia, Term Limits, and (perhaps) Raich as cases in which it did not.
And to the extent I am troubled by Raich, it’s because I doubt that if Congress had
to reenact the Controlled Substances Act today, it could do so without granting an
exemption for intrastate medical marijuana use. If the prohibition survives solely
by inertia, without any input from the people in democratic fora—Stateor
federal—then something has gone wrong.
Sincerely,
S.M.
IV. PLAIN TALK: CONGRESS’S DUTY TO SPEAK FOR THE PEOPLE
Steve,
Intriguing. But I assume that you’re not proposing a doctrine to rival the
Court’s holding in Raich. It’s hard to see what that would be. Rather, I take it
you’re expressing discomfort with Conrgess’s exercise of its power rather than its
existence—it’s almost like you’re saying something about the values implicit in
the Presentment Clause.136 I gather from what you’re saying that you approve of
sunset provisions. When something’s in doubt, put it up for a vote.
I think there are cases that support what you’re saying in the federalism
context. There’s the clear statement rule of Gregory v. Ashcroft.137 The same is
135

See John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 83-90 (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
1971), for an enlightening discussion of concepts of procedural justice in the context of Rawls’s
earlier thinking on equality of opportunity.
136
U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of
the United States; he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it ….”); see Clinton, 524
U.S. at 417.
137
See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 452 (absent “plain Statement” in federal law, federal age
discrimination act can't be applied to Statejudges ).
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true of the similar rules of Edelman v. Jordan and Atascadero StateHo spital v.
Scanlon.138 Also think about the recent decision in Gonzales v. Oregon.139
Technically, it’s about administrative law. In 2001, Attorney General John
Ashcroft promulgated a regulation stating that prescribing certain Schedule II
controlled substances for the purpose of assisting a terminally ill patient to end his
or her life is not a “legitimate medical purpose” within the meaning of the detailed
federal statutes and regulations that permit licensed physicians to prescribe
controlled substances.140 Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act was enacted by a
voter initiative in 1994.141 It proscribes certain procedures under which Oregon
physicians may lawfully distribute or prescribe, but not administer, the same
drugs.142 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court refused to show deference to
the Attorney General’s interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act or preexisting federal regulations,143 but also addressed the substance of the Attorney
General’s interpretation of the statute.144
Justice Kennedy stated unequivocally that Congress could preempt
Oregon’s law,145 but argued that the Controlled Substances Act “manifests no
intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally.”146 Better still, Justice
Kennedy stated:
Just as the conventions of expression indicate that Congress is unlikely to
alter a statute’s obvious scope and division of authority through muffled
hints, the background principles of our federal system also belie the notion
that Congress would use such an obscure grant of authority to regulate
areas traditionally supervised by the State’s police power. It is
unnecessary even to consider the application of clear statement
requirements, [citations omitted] or presumptions against preemption,
[citations omitted] to reach this commonsense conclusion.147

138

Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 651.
Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006).
140
Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 913, 915, 918.
141
Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 912.
142
Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 912-13.
143
Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 914-922 (discussing whether to provide deference under Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452 (1997) and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984) and deciding to extend no deference).
144
Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 922.
145
Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 923.
146
Id; Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 939 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
147
Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 925.
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It’s hard to pin down what this means. The Ninth Circuit cited Gregory to impose
a clear statement requirement on the Attorney General.148 And it’s also worth
noting that at one point “[l]egislation was … introduced to grant the explicit
authority” that Attorneys General Ashcroft and Gonzales asserted against Oregon,
“but it failed to pass.”149
What does Oregon mean? It’s impossible to say with any precision. But
it seems that something like your discomfort with politicians’ free riding off of
pre-existing preemption is alive and well on the Court.
Enthused,
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
You raise an excellent point. But the result wasn’t the same in the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in the internet winery case, Granholm v. Heald,
where the Supreme Court struck down Statewinery regulations under the dormant
Commerce Clause .150 Federal law preempted Statelaw without Congress having
to make any statement, much less a plain one. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion
in that case, too.151 I’ll grant that the Commerce Clause plainly puts some limits
on the States’ police powers . And these core limits should be enforced whether
Congress speaks to the issue or not. But this is really a very narrow category of
cases—Stateaction inconsistent with the exis tence of the Commerce Clause.
Perhaps even the union more generally. Indeed, something like this principle has
been affirmed in other areas of the law—most dramatically when the Supreme
Court struck down California’s “anti-Okie” law in Edwards v. California.152
A discriminatory rule against interstate migration presents an easy case.
The harder questions are of degree and extent—where to draw the line in the
average Commerce Clause case. I suspect that here, too, the answer lies in
Garcia. In most cases, Garcia should put the burden on Congress legislate if it
wants to preempt unwise State regulation. Indeed, Justice Blackmun’s opinion in
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Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 914 (quoting Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004) (in turn
quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460)).
149
Oregon, 126 S.Ct. at 913.
150
Granholm v. Heald 125 S.Ct. 1885 (2005).
151
Granholm, 125 S.Ct. at 1895 (he argued that “[t]he rule prohibiting State discrimination against
interStatecommerce follows … from the principle that States should not be compelled to
negotiate with each other regarding favored or disfavored status for their own citizens,” and that
“[s]tates do not need, and may not attempt, to negotiate with other States regarding their mutual
economic interests”).
152
See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc.,
249 U.S. 511, 523); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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Maine v. Taylor153 is very much in this vein. In Taylor, the Supreme Court
upheld an outright ban on the importation of live, out-of-Statebaitfishin Maine ;
Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court rested largely on the theory that Maine
had legitimate concerns about the potential for foreign fish to introduce
previously unknown diseases and parasites into Maine’s domestic stock.154 “Not
all intentional barriers to interstate trade”, he argued, “are protectionist … and the
Commerce Clause ‘is not a guaranty of the right to import into a Statewhatever
one may please, absent a prohibition by Congress, regardless of the effects of the
importation upon the local community.’”155 That’s the key, isn’t it? Surely the
State’s interest matters, but there’s a structural point to be made. Congress
unquestionably could defeat Maine’s ban, but until Congress legislates Maine
“retains its broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its
citizens and the integrity of its natural resources.”156 And if Congress wants to
displace Maine’s environmental policy, it should put it up for a vote. 157
Justice Stevens, very much in the mode of muddying sovereignty,
dissented in Maine v. Taylor; though he disclaimed any motive “to derogate the
State's interest in ecological purity,” he argued that “the State… should be put to
its proof,” and “the invocation of environmental protection or public health has
never been thought to confer some kind of special dispensation from the general
principle of nondiscrimination in interstate commerce.”158 That is consistent with
our reading of Raich.
So while I must confess that personally my sympathies lie with the winery
owners in Granholm, it’s clear to me that the Supreme Court’s holding in that
case takes the pressure off Congress to hold a vote on winery regulation. In fact,
the decision exercises federal power in a fairly opaque way. Congress actually
has to authorize a State to enact laws that intentionally discriminate against outof-State commerce, unless the Stateasserts a powerful interest.159 And when
Congress actually wants to preempt such laws, it gets to do so for free. 160
153
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); see also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978) for an earlier discussion of similar issues.
154
Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137-38.
155
Taylor, 477 U.S. at 149, n19 (quoting Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 458 (1946)).
156
Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151.
157
This is hardly a new concept. See Mobile Co. v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 699 (1880); and id. at
701 (discussing Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. 299 (1851)).
158
Maine v. Taylor 477 U.S. 131, 152-153 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added;
paragraph break omitted).
159
See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 140 (“Maine's ban on the importation of live baitfish thus is
constitutional only if it satisfies the requirements ordinarily applied under Hughes v. Oklahoma[,
441 U.S. 322 (1979),] to local regulation that discriminates against interStatetrade: the statute
must serve a legitimate local purpose, and the purpose must be one that cannot be served as well
by available nondiscriminatory means”); Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (“The crucial inquiry …
must be directed to determining whether [the statute] is basically a protectionist measure, or
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Regards,
S.M.
Steve,
Clever debating strategy. You know my sympathies for Harry Blackmun
opinions.161 I can’t for the life of me understand why Garcia has fallen out of
favor. Garcia was one of his best opinions, and has much significance here, for it
reinforces the fact that Congress has the exclusive Commerce Power and the
States can participate in its exercise. But Justice Blackmun was but one Justice,
and he is, sadly, no longer on the Court. So, my question to you is: does the
Gonzales v. Oregon and Maine v. Taylor theory of federalism have any life left in
it on the modern Supreme Court? Granted, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
are blank slates in this regard. But aside from undisciplined tealeaf reading about
the larger story of Gonzales v. Oregon, can we learn anything from the other
Justices?
Curious,
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
Well, there’s Justice Thomas. He concurred in the judgment in the recent
American Trucking Associations case, where the Supreme Court upheld a $100
whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon
interStatecommerce that are only incidental”); cf. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)
(“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interStatecommerce are only incidental , it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443, 80 S.Ct. 813, 816, 4 L.Ed.2d 852. If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree”).
160
And what Congress gets can be valuable indeed. Consider Justice Souter’s similar arguments
about local rights in another environmental case, C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S.
383, 421 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556), where he dissented
from the Supreme Court’s decision in that case to strike down a law establishing municipally
owned waste collection and providing it with special rights. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s arguments
in his dissent in the Healy case have much the same ring, West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512
U.S. 186, 216-217 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.) (quoting New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Chief Justice Rehnquist
focused on the notion of comity, in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Quality
of State of Or. 511 U.S. 93, 111-12 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.),
where the Supreme Court invalidated yet another solid waste regulation. Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s point is well taken: if comity means anything, it means not treating your neighbor as
a garbage heap.
161
Professor Bezanson worked as a law clerk for Justice Harry A. Blackmun in October Term
1972 (1972-73). He and Justice Blackmun maintained strong ties long after Professor Bezanson
left his position as a clerk.
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fee Michigan levies on intrastate commercial trucking under the Commerce
Clause.162 He argued that “‘[t]he negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the
text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in
application,’ ... and, consequently, cannot serve as a basis for striking down a
State statute.”163 Justice Scalia is somewhat more restrained. He concurred In
West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, where the Supreme Court struck down a
Massachusetts program under which the Statecollected mandatory fees from all
sellers of milk in Massachusetts (some of whom were not from Massachusetts) for
a fund to be distributed to all producers of milk in Massachusetts (all of whom
were from Massachusetts).164 Justice Scalia conceded that the Commerce Clause
was written “to create a national market,” but he argued that “[i]t does not follow
from that … that every State law which obstructs a national market violates the
Commerce Clause. Yet that is what the Court says [in Healy],” and “ … this
expansive view of the Commerce Clause calls into question a wide variety of
State laws that have hitherto been thought permissible,” including purely
monetary subsidies.165 Justice Scalia therefore announced that he “will, on stare
decisis grounds, enforce a self-executing ‘negative’ Commerce Clause in two
situations: (1) against a State law that facially discriminates against interstate
commerce, and (2) against a Statelaw that is indistinguishable from a type of law
previously held unconstitutional by this Court.”166 And thus Scalia strives to
“produce a clear rule that honors the holdings of our past decisions but declines to
extend the rationale that produced those decisions any further.”167
Granted, Justices Scalia and Thomas haven’t embraced our broad, vague,
and mushy preference for clear statements. But there’s something attractive about
the transparency involved in their arguments, isn’t there? When you think about
this position alongside his Raich concurrence, Justice Scalia is consistent—he
rejects a broad dormant Commerce Clause and embraces a theoretically robust
(and doctrinally sound) view of Commerce Clause power. I also think that Justice
162
Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 125 S.Ct. 2419 (2005); id. at 2426 (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment).
163
Id. (citations omitted).
164
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
165
Healy, 512 U.S. at 207-208 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id., at 211-12 (footnote omitted)
(“I would therefore allow a State to subsidize its domestic industry so long as it does so from
nondiscriminatory taxes that go into the State's general revenue fund. Perhaps, as some
commentators contend, that line comports with an important economic reality: A Stateis less
likely to maintain a subsidy when its citizens perceive that the money (in the general fund) is
available for any number of competing, nonprotectionist, purposes”). We assume that we may
ignore the subsidy effects of the market participant doctrine, see Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429 (1980), for the purposes of Justice Scalia’s concurrence. See also Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 125
S.Ct. at 2426 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, citing to his Healy opinion).
166
Healy, 512 U.S. at 210 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
167
Id. (citations omitted).
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Kennedy wins a prize for consistency—he’s has somewhat consistently
elaborated his views on divided sovereignty.168
One could argue that Congress’s power affirmatively to regulate national
life through Article I, section 8 may be distinguished from, and should receive
different treatment than, Congress’s power under the same Clause negatively to
displace obnoxious State regulations. This seems to me, however, to be a
distinction without a difference. To justify such an assumption, one must assume
that Congress is simply not to be trusted with economic stewardship of the
nation,169 or that somehow Article I, section 8 is a grant of power to the Supreme
Court rather than to Congress.
Regards,
S.M.
Steve,
Maybe. I’m troubled, though. It’s almost like we have dueling default
rules in the opinions. Perhaps we can State the problem as follows: unless the
self-executing Commerce Clause is a default rule to which Congress has to give
special exceptions (Justices Scalia and Thomas reject the principle outright, and
surely Justice Stevens doesn’t mean to embrace it), there has to be a mechanism
for resolving conflicts. But it doesn’t appear that Stevens has one, aside from the
somewhat unhelpful proposition that the presumption must be toward the
invalidity of discriminatory regulation. But transparency aside, I think the same
goes for the conservatives. They adopt the opposite default rule. This isn’t very
helpful because when there is no discrimination on the face a State statute (where
the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test applies170), the question of the police
power is not squarely presented. The Pike test is deferential to the States. But
where the law is discriminatory, the Stateis asserting one of its sovereign powers.
There’s a conflict here that has to be resolved somehow. And I hope there’s more
to ask than whether the State interest is important and whether it can be served by
nondiscriminatory means.171
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With respect to Justice Kennedy, see, e.g., Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 838 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“The Framers split the atom of sovereignty”); Granholm v. Heald 125 S.Ct. at 1885;
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Or, perhaps more precisely, not to be trusted not to resist the temptation to save political capital
and garner political points in the States by refusing to displace State political settlements already
won. Admittedly, Congress is the birthplace of collective action problems. Structural collective
action problems, if proved to exist for a particular issue or range of issues, might change the
analysis and justify Supreme Court intervention. An argument would need to be offered up,
however, to show why this issue is different from that or most issues.
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Pike, 397 U.S. at 137; see note 159, supra.
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See authorities cited in note 159, supra.
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Before we move on, let me try to get to the bottom of these issues. First,
let me try to restate briefly your analysis and interpretation, with some
extrapolation of my own, perhaps. Negative Commerce Clause doctrine is
incoherent in many settings, especially beyond discrimination against interstate
commerce. And, more importantly, it lacks textual or theoretical justification in
the Constitution. It doesn’t explain why Stateregulations that discriminate against
or interfere with the national market should be (presumptively?) unconstitutional,
either in terms of the States’ governing authority (I prefer that to “sovereignty”,
which I deem a pretty useless term) or in terms of Congress’s exclusive and
enumerated power. The effect of broad judicial intervention is to cut Congress,
the power-holder, out of the circle. And this is justified partly on the ground that
Congress (these days) is not in a position to act. But Courts can.
In the abstract, at least, this is a remarkable and structurally destructive
tautology. An alternative view, voiced in our exchange by Justice Blackmun,
shifts the presumption of unconstitutionality in cases involving (here I generalize
the view, which rests heavily on the environmental interests of States) a State’s
political actions designed to protect the health and welfare interests of its citizens
even if the effect of such actions interferes with the national market and/or
disproportionately burdens interstate commerce. In such cases the Stateis
exercising its police power—governing in the health and welfare interests of its
population—which it is entitled to, and indeed must, do under the federal system
established by the Constitution—de facto, not de jure.
Judicial preemption of such Stateregulations is unjustified for many
possible reasons: (a) because the Judicial Branch does not have such broad
Commerce Power; (b) because in doing so it invades the State’s sovereignty ,
dignity, or, as I prefer, its practically essential governing power; (c) because
judges don’t have the knowledge or capacity to decide such “interference”
questions and weigh the State’s policies (or even ascertain them); or (d) because it
cuts the federal legislative process out, making political compromises and
settlements unlikely because the Court has already settled the matter.
It is the last point that’s most interesting. Garcia suggests that negative
Commerce Clause doctrine is not only cutting Congress out, but preempting a
structural and valuable element of the Constitutional system that safeguards State
interests. To state our point briefly: the States’ structural protections —
opportunities for individual or collective defense of their interests in the
Constitutional scheme—require legislative action at the federal level,
accompanied by the procedural and substantive protections of States in that
process (bicameralism,172 nondelegation,173 limits on federal administrative
172

Chada, 462 U.S. at 919; see also Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Airport Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991).

40

action,174 presentment,175 representation in the Senate for States, 176 and the like).
If the judicial branch would stay out of most negative implications conflicts, the
issues presented by Stateregulation could, if deemed important to federal
interests, be taken up and negotiated with the States’ participation in the House
and Senate and the White House, the Constitutional lociof the power to regulate
commerce among the States.
I find this view much more satisfying than appeals to “federalism” or
“sovereignty.” It seems that every Justice has his or her own definition or
intuition about federalism, from very little (Stevens, Ginsburg) to some (Kennedy,
O’Connor) to everything (Thomas), with others lurking in the cracks. And I like
your view’s location in Garcia and the structural and procedural, rather than the
substantive, language of Constitutional doctrine.
But questions abound. What is the counterpoint, if any, in Commerce
Clause doctrine, to such a structural understanding from negative Commerce
Clause doctrine? Here are some thoughts. In Commerce Clause doctrine,
enumeration is the limit. But substantive justifications have always found their
way into the analysis (federalism, Statesovereign interests, etc.) because
enumeration-based formulaic limits, by themselves, can’t stand without a
background—presently vaguely substantive177—explanation. One answer is that
Garcia is the limit here, too: process alone is the key, and as long as Congress
follows the prescribed process (with its implications for cutting back on
delegation, restricting executive lawmaking power, etc.), it can do what it wants.
Indeed, Justice Souter made this very argument in Morrison, rooting his analysis
in Garcia and the Seventeenth Amendment.178 Yet that seems a bit unsatisfying
and incomplete. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, the Congress is not a
Parliament.179 But without resort to “federalism” and “sovereignty,” there are
alternative and narrower substantive limits: the words “commerce” and “among
173

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see
Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 Mich. L.Rev. 303, 336 (1999).
174
E.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006); see notes 139-49, supra.
175
Clinton (The Line Item Veto Case), 524 U.S. at 417.
176
U.S. CONST., Art. V (“… no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of it’s [sic] equal
Suffrage in the Senate”).
177
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-616 (2000) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575-79 (Kennedy, J,
concurring)); see not 17, supra.
178
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 649-52 (Souter, J., dissenting), arguing, among other things, that the
Seventeenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. Amdt. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years ….”) and
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. at 528, altered the constitutional calculus,
and, in effect, remanded federalism disputes to the court of politics. Indeed, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s argument that Congress should be understood emphatically not to be like Parliament,
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616, n7; see note 33, supra, was made in response to this point.
179
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616, n7.
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the States.” As to these things, the Judicial Branch can perhaps justify its judicial
review power—a substantive terms-defining power, but not broader “federalism-”
and “sovereignty-” based creative power. Raich seems very much to respect such
a distinction, even if its holding isn’t clear on the face of the Court’s opinions.
Is the presence of such limited judicial power in the Commerce Clause
setting the counterpart to the discrimination-line power exercised by the Court,
and accepted by Scalia, in the negative commerce cases? Perhaps so. Such a
view clearly makes some sense. But if so, what does the permissible reach of
judicially-enforced negative Commerce Clause limits consists of? It surely can’t
consist of “federalism,” or all is lost in the symmetrical analysis. And I doubt that
it can consist of a definition of the “police power,” which really defies definition
and in any event is not stated or conferred in the Constitution.
Here’s a thought. Instead of police power (or perhaps in recognition, but
not constitutionalization, of it) the limit of Statepower is that a Statemay not
exercise the commerce power in Article I, section 8, because the commerce power
is exclusive. That’s the flip side of what Chief Justice Marshall said in the
passage you’ve quoted from Gibbons. When can it be said that theStateis
exercising the commerce power? Certainly not in the instance you draw from
Taylor. There, commerce is affected, even changed, but the aim of the law or
regulation is purely local and undoubtedly a bona fide exercise of the State’s
governing (police) power. This is so even if the regulation overtly discriminates
against out of State commerce. But some regulations discriminate against out of
State commerce with no other possible interest than giving Stateinterests a
commercial advantage over out of Stateinterests ; economic protectionism, in
itself, is the means employed to achieve other putative interests which themselves
are commercial—the milk cases versus quarantines to protect livestock from
disease.180 Such laws are unconstitutional unless Congress expressly adopts them
as its own.
I’m not certain that this works as an explanation of the cases, but if it or
some variant of the idea does work, it can set the boundary between valid and
invalid State laws at the (judicially manageable) definitional level of whether the
State is exercising the exclusive commerce power, rather than make it turn on
whether federalism or sovereignty interests have been violated or insensitively
balanced. The federalism and sovereignty interests, instead, have been reflected
in the balance struck in the Commerce Clause, as we have similarly suggested for
the commerce power itself. More broadly we might posit that the sovereignty or
federalism interests in much (all?) of the Constitution have been already balanced
in the structural protections surrounding the exercise of federal power, a’la
Garcia.
180

See, e.g. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 131.
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So much for federalism at large; there is no “brooding omnipresence in the
sky.”
Federal supremacy means federal supremacy, not some larger theory of
dual sovereignty that might, in a better world, prohibit commandeering and
unfunded mandates. What are the implications of our emerging, largely practical
and non-ideological, approach to “federalism” and “sovereignty” concepts in the
Constitution? It seems to me that (1) the methodologies employed by both camps
in the Term Limits opinion were erroneous, as no overarching principles about the
source of power can or should be divined, must less applied, in the Constitution or
its history (and, it may be added, neither overarching principle really resolved the
issue in the case, which would be better addressed by text and history at the retail
level); and (2) the operable conception of the Constitutional system was a
melange of varying ideas and practical realities and known uncertainties that lay
ahead, borne by, I suspect, a deep suspicion of “pure” theory, as acted out in the
French Revolution.182
Federalism is an interpretive device, but not a freestanding one. Of the
two models with which we began this exchange, we’re closer to model (2), the
enumerated powers independent Statemodel,but we’re not entirely divorced
from the spirit of model (1). We’ve seen that substantive theories of federalism
and sovereignty have little explanatory force when we approach the document at
any significant level of specificity. You keep reiterating your adherence to a
complex, multilayered theory of sovereignty, but in law a theory of sovereignty
that refers to everything governs nothing. Vague sovereignty has no specific
meaning, except in one sense. It pushes us to see the Constitution is a rules-ofthe-game document, a practical guide to representative government in a layered,
federal, system produced by a political consensus that had pre-digested the
varying strands of intellectual thought at the time. It is not a script intended to
evoke and enliven judicial resort to larger political or philosophical ideas such as
“federalism” or “sovereignty.”
We need to think about the implications of generalizing this approach. Its
value (as well as risk) would be experimentation (part of O’Connor’s tetherless
federalism in Raich); its justification, as with the Commerce Clause, would be
enumeration and what it implies—the necessary resort to the structured political
process to work out solutions if they are deemed necessary at the federal level.
Regards,
R.B.
181
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Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The common
law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi
sovereign that can be identified; although some decisions with which I have disagreed seem to me
to have forgotten the fact”).
182
Alexander Bickel, The Morality of Consent 12-25 (1975) (discussing Edmund Burke’s
Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790)).
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V. UNION REVISITED
Professor Bezanson,
Well, let’s not be too hasty. Maybe we can take another look at the idea of
the union. It seems to matter to the Justices. In Granholm, Justice Kennedy put
forward the odd assertion that the prohibition on outright interstate discrimination
“is essential to the foundations of the Union. The mere fact of nonresidence
should not foreclose a producer in one Statefrom access to markets in other
States.”183 Rhetoric about the union is a commonplace in the dormant Commerce
Clause cases.184 But the rhetoric of union must be the beginning rather than the
end of the inquiry. Obviously, some federally-imposed limitations on State
regulatory powers are logically essential to the existence of the union. The
Supreme Court can surely enforce sweeping preemption of Stateaction without
Congress’s approval if the alternative is political collapse and economic and
military ruin—the very reasons for the Constitution’s existence.185 But except for
State-imposed barriers to interstate travel and migration,186 State negotiation of
treaties and trade agreements with other States or with foreign nations ,187
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nullification and interposition,188 secession,189 and the like, that principle doesn’t
compel many specific limitations on the State’s power.
Let me recast the question—we’re defining Stateregulatory authority in
the shadow of federal power. We’re looking for a definition of the police power,
which can be thought of as the sum total ofStateregulatory powers left over after
their abrogation by self-executing constitutional provisions and constitutionally
enacted federal statutes. Chief Justice Taney defined this constellation of powers
in the language of territorial sovereignty in Thurlow v. Massachusetts;190
But what are the police powers of a State? They are nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent
of its dominions. [It is] … the power to govern men and things within the
limits of its dominion. It is by virtue of this power that it legislates; and its
authority to make regulations of commerce is as absolute as its power to
pass health laws, except in so far as it has been restricted by the
constitution of the United States. 191
But this is deeply question-begging. The real question is how tightly the
Constitution “restrict[s]” the powers of the States. According to Chief Justice
Taney “it necessarily follows that the grant of power to the federal government is
not an absolute and entire prohibition to the States, but merely confers upon
Congress the superior and controlling power.”192 But this is to state the same
problem in different words. The scope of the “superior and controlling power”
and the question whether it should be politically or judicially enforced are the
heart of the matter.
We’ve really got to think about what it means to have concurrent powers
and dual sovereignty. The idea of concurrent powers is certainly familiar. The
Supreme Court has seen regulatory powers over commerce as inherently
concurrent since the 1820s;Gibbons v. Ogden made the point in reference to
concurrent Stateand federal powers of taxation, concluding that no logical or
Stateagencies not to conduct business with companies that trade with Burma was preempted by
federal trade sanctions regime).
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legal paradox emerges by the concession that both the States and the union can
tax (and tax heavily) the same activity.193 Chief Justice Marshall suggested that
this issue emerges from the very form of our government:
In our complex system, presenting the rare and difficult scheme of one
general government, whose action extends over the whole, but which
possesses only certain enumerated powers; and of numerous State
governments, which retain and exercise all powers not delegated to the
Union, contests respecting power must arise. Were it even otherwise, the
measures taken by the respective governments to execute their
acknowledged powers, would often be of the same description, and might,
sometimes, interfere. This, however, does not prove that the one is
exercising, or has a right to exercise, the powers of the other.194
It’s the last sentence that’s key. I think the implicit suggestion is thatStateand
federal power should be analyzed as distinct phenomena. As we have said several
times, the separate governments’ powers are, and should remain, conceptually
separate. Stateand federal powers do not flow from the same source. The zenith
of one is not the nadir of the other.
But if that’s true then many things follow. First, something more than a
definition is needed to show that the police power is necessarily unlimited outside
the area of federal preemption. Second, the Blackmun-esque view of complex
and layered sovereignty, as in Garcia, with many actors speaking in different
voices at different times, and/or the Kennedy-esque view of dual sovereignty,
with State and federal actors each taking different and overlapping parts of the
original powers delegated by “we, the people,” become much more attractive.
Regards,
S.M.
Steve,
I find your idea of accommodation even in the preemption setting to be
very interesting, and certainly of a piece with the larger idea. In the Oregon case,
however, we needn’t go so far. The federal Controlled Substances Act exempts
use of the otherwise prohibited or regulated drugs if they are sold or administered
pursuant to a physician’s prescription for treatment that meets reasonable medical
standards.195 The Oregon law does not violate the act, Oregon argued, because
Oregon has passed a law that alters the licensing and medical practice standards
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set, traditionally and today, by the states.196 The federal government’s argument
was that the new medical standards set by Oregon do not satisfy the Controlled
Substances Act, not because the act specifically outlaws assisted suicide by doctor
and patient at the very end of life, but because the federal government has some
general authority via the Attorney General to decide whether medical standards in
states are acceptable in light of the law enforcement purposes of the Act.197 This
is a general, and largely administrative and law enforcement authority.198 It is not
an express federal power going to the specific drug(s) used in specific ways
authorized under the Oregon law. This makes the case different from Raich
because there were no exceptions of this kind for the sale of marijuana and the
California law in any event didn’t limit itself (or perhaps even deal with) the
practice of medicine issues.
Thus Gonzales is much closer to the pure negative implications cases, and
so Oregon can make the more straightforward negative implications-type
argument on behalf of state legislative power in the absence of congressional
action under Art. I, section 8. This is an argument that would be greatly
strengthened by a recognized claim that when a state acts within its traditional
police powers and in the absence of economically protectionist discrimination
against interstate commerce, the national market interests and solutions rest not
with courts, but with Congress and the President exercising legislative powers
under Articles I and II.
Sincerely,
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
I think you give us too little credit. While decided on grounds of
deference (lack of it, actually) to the Attorney General's rulemaking power under
federal law, the Gonzales decision rests on an expressed background of traditional
state lawmaking, and by disallowing the Attorney Generals’s power under the
federal law it puts the matter back into Congress’s lap where the States can launch
a full and fair fight under the Garcia principles.
Genially,
S.M.
Steve,
If that is true, then it seems, as a general matter, that we have settled on
something very practical. We see “federalism” not as a theory and legal doctrine,
but instead as a set of obstacles in the field of government power. To stretch the
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sports metaphor, these posts and barriers prevent any of the contestants from
running the field, and serve as brakes or required resting points at which the
contestants must count to ten and think carefully about what they are doing. The
hope is to slow the brutality and engender, to the extent possible, cooperation and
compromise and constructive competition.
So there is no grand Constitutional federalism that stands as an
unbreachable chasm between state and federal power. There is, really, no
schematic of “sovereignty” that can be usefully drawn upon. In a very American
way, I think, sovereignty was quite decisively dispensed with as a term used,
much less enforced, in the internal governance and affairs of the nation. The
nation was sovereign among nations, but not within itself. This would mean, of
course (if we are right), that the Supreme Court has profoundly miscalculated the
nature of the Constitution’s structural design. There is no “brooding
omnipresence.”199 There is no architect and no controlling philosophy. There is
instead an imperfect and therefore malleable, immensely practical, and basically
non-theoretical set of rules with which to govern a republic committed to
democratic participation and the powerful idea of freedom and personal liberty.
No absolutes. No precincts of unreviewable power. No corners free of healthy
competition. Nothing too tidy.
In terms of the instances of “federalism” upon which the Supreme Court
has lately focused its attention, what have we? We have a clear governing rule of
enumeration at the federal level, which many say has served as a means of
aggrandizement of federal power through the commerce and spending powers.200
But we find no mention of “federalism” in Article I, section 8. No high theory.
Instead we find an untidy and imperfect set of enumerated powers which
necessarily change over time—in degree but not in kind.
McCulloch v. Maryland, with its reading of enumeration and the
Necessary and Proper Clause, is not easily confined. There is nothing wrong with
the Supreme Court trying to tweak it and shore it up, as in Lopez and Morrison.
But the bludgeon of federalism, of separate and sealed “fields” of authority for the
federal government and for the states, simply won’t do. It can’t work, for the
bread of enumeration isn’t sliced along substantive lines. More importantly, it
isn’t what was put in the Constitution. Enumeration is a practical and very
important obstacle, a place to count to ten and give second thought. And a place
to make certain that the other structural brakes—the Garcia rules of state
participation, bicameralism, presentment, constrained delegation, and the like—
are fully and fairly in place.
The Court should see other constitutional provisions and rules in a similar
way. The Eleventh Amendment, for example, shouldn’t be seen as a spare text
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engorged by federalism and sovereignty. Sovereignty and its conceit, dignity,
have no place in the operative doctrines of the Constitution. Instead Article III’s
jurisdictional rules and the Eleventh Amendment’s limits should be seen as
practical instruments for protecting against the bankruptcy of government itself
and from the subjugation of one government by the threat of economic ruin by the
other. These are practical ideas that allow textual and practical legal rules, and
that allow a healthy measure of flexibility for future adjustment (Ex Parte Young,
for example) if wielded by a reasoned hand in obedience to other structural rules
of limited judicial power or legislative process.
Two other constitutional provisions deserve mention here. The first is the
qualifications provision of Article I. That provision needn’t, and in our view
shouldn’t, be seen as a font of sovereignty, a term not used in the Constitution,
borne at the creation. The remarkable conceptual and historical exercises played
out by, among others, Justices Stevens and Thomas, are neither provable or
usefully operable in law. It seems clear to us that the people of the states voted in
their states to express their agreement on the creation of a government of the
people of the nation.
Finally, a surprisingly broad array of the federalism rules are non-textual,
which is to say that they are of the Court’s own creation. This is most obviously
true of the intergovernmental immunities doctrines, which have ebbed and flowed
for over a century. It is true also of the most recent arrival in the immunities
family, the commandeering rule prohibiting the federal government from using
states as lawmaking, enforcing, and judicial agents of federal will. These sets of
doctrines can be seen in two ways. The first, the Supreme Court’s, looks at them
as protections for the states’ dignity and sovereign separateness. The second way
of looking at the doctrines is that the Court, extra-textually but perhaps for good
reason, has created them as practically necessary obstacles to aggrandizement.
The latter is obviously our view. Under that view there is nothing wrong with the
Court’s creativity if the rules allow for flexibility. If they were absolute they
would then become barriers in the name of state authority and not obstacles
requiring occasions for sober political reflection. The bright-line absolutism of
the commandeering doctrine, then, is misplaced.
The need for judicially crafted practical obstacles flexibly enforced to
accommodate the occasional conflicts between the federal government and the
States is, in its best sense, reflected in the judiciary’s own rules of abstention and
comity.201 Abstention is, at base, a practical and functional set of rules by which a
state court’s greater ability to adjudicate certain local or complex regulatory
issues is taken advantage of, but not at the expense (as opposed to delay) of
opportunity for federal court jurisdiction over the federal issues. Comity likewise
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respects states’ law enforcement powers as well as the Supremacy Clause
obligation imposed on state courts by the Constitution, by deferring federal court
review of federal claims until completion of the state criminal prosecution, absent
specific reasons to distrust the state court’s willingness to obey federal law. But
the comity doctrine is not textually compelled, as opposed to textually informed.
It is not fixed. It has expanded beyond criminal prosecutions.202 And it has
exceptions built into it—occasions for calm reflection. It is thus of a piece with
the adjustments of federal and state claims of power occasioned by a judiciallycreated obstacle, but not a barrier.
A last lesson, this one a message to the judicial branch when exercising
federal power, comes from the negative implications cases. There we see that
encroachment by judicial supervision of state laws has effectively sheltered
Congress from its constitutional responsibility to enact legislation preserving a
national economy when it judges that local state laws serving local purposes have
excessively disrupted its own view of the desired national market. The Court has
(inadvertently it seems) sapped the marketplace of state experimentation and has
preempted Congress’ exclusive power to define what the market should be. The
Supreme Court is acting like the nation’s economist-in-chief, and nothing in the
text of the Constitution gives it the power to do so. Congress has that power and
responsibility, except in the rarest of cases that compel judicial action. The power
to “regulate commerce among the States” belongs, after all, to Congress.
So that’s where I see us ending up. The Court has taken us on a
misconceived and constitutionally erroneous mission in the name of federalism
and sovereignty. It should stop spinning high theories of “federalism” and
“sovereignty” that the Constitution does not create. It should return to enforcing
the obstacles set out in the Constitution; to assuring the integrity of the structural
processes for exercise of federal power; and making the competing interests—the
States and Congress—count to ten and give sober second thought when an
obstacle is approached. Doing so will be more than enough to keep the Court
plenty busy.
Regards,
R.B.
Professor Bezanson,
Is the liberal view any more coherent than the conservative view? No.
One-directional constructs don’t tell us very much about how to interpret specific
language in the Constitution. And the moderate construct we’ve discussed,
Justice Kennedy’s insistence on speaking in terms of divided sovereignty, is so
vague that despite its essential accuracy, sometimes I think it provides less
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practical advice than the alternatives. It’s not the Justices fault. Federalism,
sovereignty—it’s a slippery subject. And in this area of the law, there is a
temptation to lose oneself in the sort of philosophical reflection that leads to long,
opaque essays. Opaque essay-writing is aweakness from which I suffer as well.
I’m troubled by your praise for the abstention doctrines. I’ve never been
the most enthusiastic fan of abstention—I never like to shut the federal courthouse
doors, even temporarily. Your point, however, is well-taken. The courts aren’t
fora for philosophical reflection. They’re places to resolve disputes. And if we’re
going to have two court systems with two bodies of law and separate spheres of
jurisdiction and supremacy, then we’ve got to have some mechanism for
commodiously moving cases from one system to the next, where each claim can
be presented and adjudicated in its proper way.
Perhaps this is the final lesson of our engaging exchange. Divided
sovereignty comes with its price. The Constitution seems to ask us to accept that
the federal legislature partakes of a bewildering duality; that this is part of the
framers’ design; and that Congress will, in the long run, tend to get it right on
most federalism issues. The Bill of Rights charms us with its gripping political
principles. No great creative mind is needed to see the First Amendment at work.
The structural clauses of the Constitution, however, are works of artifice. They
are dry. They are technical. They do not speak in poetry to the moral
imagination. The clauses of the Constitution ask us for faith in its designs. I like
to think I carry the faith, but it is hard for me, as I know it is sometimes hard for
all of us, to accept the short run. And sometimes, and the Supreme Court is no
exception to this rule, we strain to anticipate framers. I think that patience, in the
end, is the constitutional virtue.
Cheers,
S.M.
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